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ABSTRACT 
 
AN ANALYSIS OF LEGISLATIVE INSTRUMENTS IN THE EUROPEAN UNION 
FROM THE LIBERAL INTERGOVERNMENTALIST PERSPECTIVE 
 
 
MERYEM KÖSEHASANOĞULLARI 
 
M.A. in European Studies Program, Thesis 2009 
 
Supervisor: Prof. Dr. Meltem Müftüler-Baç 
 
Keywords: Legislation in European Union, Co-decision Procedure, Qualified Majority Voting,     
       Liberal Intergovernmentalism. 
 
Argument of the evolution of the EU integration towards a supranational end and in contrast 
claim of continuing member states’ control on conclusions both handle institutional reforms as 
means for their interpretation of EU integration. One side asserts that each development 
through supranationalism leads to the decrease in the member states’ autonomy and 
capabilities, whereas the other approach advocates that these developments would be the 
consequence of the aim of member states to achieve a higher benefit without compromising 
more. By depending on their commonality, this thesis focuses on these legislative instruments 
to clarify the current positions and roles of member states in decision-making process. As a 
result, lack of such restrictions in legislation of EU verifies the continuing autonomy and 
competence of national governments and determines the international bargaining and in relation 
relative power of member states as assisting factors of their ongoing authority, rather than 
restrictions.  
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ÖZET 
 
LĐBERAL HÜKÜMETLERARASI TEORĐ’DEN 
AVRUPA BĐRLĐĞĐ’NĐN YASAMA ARAÇLARI ANALĐZĐ 
 
MERYEM KÖSEHASANOĞULLARI 
 
Avrupa Çalışmaları Yüksek Lisans Programı, Tez, 2009 
 
Danışman: Prof. Dr. Meltem Müftüler-Baç 
 
Anahtar Kelimeler: Avrupa Birliği’nde yasama, Ortak karar usulü, Nitelikli Çoğunluk  
           Oylaması, Liberal Hükümetlerarası Teori 
 
AB entegrasyonunda uluslarüstü sona doğru evrimleşme argümanı ve kararlar üzerinde devam 
eden üye devlet kontrolünü savunan iddia, AB entegrasyonuna yönelik yaklaşımlarını 
açıklarken kurumsal reformları bir araç olarak kullanırlar. Bir taraf uluslarüstü gelişmeye doğru 
ilerleryen üye devletlerin otonomi ve kabiliyetlerinin azalacağını savunurken diğer grup daha 
yararlı bir sonuca daha fazla ödün vermeden ulaşabilmek için verilmiş bir kararın sonucu olarak 
görür bu değişimleri. Bu ortak noktayı baz alarak bu tez karar alma mekanizaması içinde üye 
devletlerin posizyonları ve rollerini açıklayabilmek amacıyla yasama araçları üzerinde 
yoğunlaşır. AB yasaması içerisinde bulunduğu iddia edilen engellerin var olmadığı sonucu üye 
devletlerin devam eden otonomi ve yetkinliklerini doğrular ve uluslararası pazarlık ve bağlı 
olarak üye devletlerin göreli gücünün ve otoritesinin engelleyici değil destekleyici etkenler 
olduğunu kanıtlar.  
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 1 
ITRODUCTIO 
 
 Liberal Intergovernmentalism 
 
Ongoing European integration of member states from both sides of deepening 
and widening necessitates further explanation from each theory of integration, in which 
European Union’s (EU) institutional reforms are used as means of their interpretations. 
One of the most criticized integration theory; intergovernmentalism is a state-centric 
approach of European integration. According to this theory, individual players; states in 
particular national governments are “the initiators, promoters, mediators, legislators and 
promulgators of”1 the present and the future of EU functioning and its integration path. 
As Moravcsik argues, “the primary source of integration lies in the interests of the 
states themselves and the relative power each brings to Brussels.2 State-centric 
approach advocates that the preferences, which are reflected on EU law, are the lowest 
common denominator among member states in particular national governments’ 
positions.3 That represents the common position on the lowest level of benefits that is 
acceptable for all member states. Therefore, none of the national governments are 
obliged to accept policies that are vital to their national interest.  
 
Initial approach to the relationship between national and international level was 
created by Robert Putnam in 1988. As Rosamond elucidates, Putnam builds a bridge 
between domestic politics and international relations. Putnam’s two-level game 
constitutes national officials, who are willing to improve their stances on both levels. At 
the national level, they try to congregate domestic groups to form coalitions and at the 
international level, they bargain to strengthen their domestic position along national 
preferences stemming from the formed coalition.4 This approach becomes the sources 
of the composition of many other perspectives such as liberal intergovernmentalism.  
 
As the founding father of liberal intergovernmentalism, Andrew Moravcsik 
formulates a three-level game similar to Putman’s. According to Moravcsik, all 
                                                 
1 Puchala,D.J.(1999). Institutionalism, Intergovernmentalism, European Integration:A  Review   
   Article.Journal of Common Market Studies, 37(2), p. 319 
2 Moravcsik, A.(1991). Negotiating the Single European Act.International Organization, 45(1), p.56.  
3 Hooghe,L.&Marks,G.(2003). Multi-Level Governance in the European Union. In Nelsen B.&Stubb A.   
   The European Union (281-311).Colorado:Reiner. p. 284  
4 Rosamond, B.(2000). Intergovernmental Europe?. Theories of European Integration. p. 136. 
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member states are rational players, which Moravcsik defines his approach as ‘New 
Synthesis’ that conjoins theories of political economy, bargaining and international 
regime all together. Member states follow this path in accordance to Moravcsik’s 
approach: 
 
“1. they formulate preferences in response to functional policy interdependence 
  2. they engage in interstate bargaining to achieve Pareto-improving solutions  
      and resolve distributional conflicts  
  3. they delegate or pool sovereignty in international institutions to extend,   
      implement, or enforce those bargains.”5 
 
First stage constitutes national government’s preference formation in relation to 
the interdependences among member states. National preferences may be the outcomes 
of economic, geopolitical or ideological interests of member states. Yet, Moravcsik 
stresses that the economic interests were the main driving force for member states since 
1957, however he adds that there are also several cases that geopolitical and ideological 
interests may have been dominant, for instance Germany in 1960s.6 Second stage refers 
to the bargaining process among national governments. Bargaining among member 
states were mostly devolved on relative power of national governments, which varies 
due to the ‘asymmetric policy interdependence’ among member states. For instance, 
France would find itself vulnerable on the topic of agriculture, on account of its high 
employment in agricultural sector; however it does not constitute a crucial place in 
British interest, due to the opposite situation in UK. Finally, third stage can be seen as 
the consequence of the extension of co-decision procedure.  
 
Recent debates on institutional reforms in EU as the empowerment of a 
supranational institution, in particular Parliament by co-decision procedure, lead to 
tough criticisms on state-centric approaches by arguing weakening of 
intergovernmental block as Council of Ministers (the Council) and in relation decline of 
state powers on EU-level. Nevertheless, Moravcsik’s approach to the co-decision 
procedure is the ‘redistribution of powers already delegated to the Union by the 
member states in favor of the Parliament and in expense of the Commission’.7 EU’s 
institutional reforms were supported by national government due to the aim to create an 
                                                 
5 Moravcsik, A.(2008). European Constitutional Settlement. The World Economy,31(1), p.158. 
6 Ibid. p.161. 
7 Warleigh, A.(2002). Substantive Democracy and Institutional Change: The Paradox of Codecision.    
   EUROPUB Conference Paper, 14-15 December 2002. p.6.  
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efficient legislative procedure, while preserving the Council’s superiority. As Puchala 
maintains, Moravcsik’s perspective of ‘delegating or pooling’ stems from “the leaders 
of national governments responding to demands from national constituencies and 
reacting to imperatives from the global economy.”8 In order to achieve a greater 
compromise for their substantive interests, the results of each delegating or pooling of 
national governments have been assessed in detail as France during CAP debates of 
1960’s. 9  
 
The basis of this approach is the limitation of capabilities and autonomy of 
supranational institutions by national governments, because their duty is to ‘serve the 
ultimate goals of national governments’10 and operate within the limits determined by 
national governments’ preferences. They do not have any autonomy and power 
independent from national governments’ conclusions.        
 
Nevertheless, institutionalism’s basis on the grounds of the following argument: 
‘Institutions make a difference.’ The explanation of the European integration path 
includes an evolution of supranational institutions. That requires the increase in the 
autonomy and authority, improvement in the capabilities of supranational institutions, 
in expense of the national governments.  Thus, from institutionalist point of view 
‘delegating and pooling’ are the consequences of “intra-European international 
relations primarily driven by the influences of supranational agents responding to 
demands from transnational society.”11 Stone Sweet and Sandholtz envisage the future 
of EU as follows: 
 
“We view intergovernmental bargaining and decision making as embedded in 
process that are provoked and sustained by the expansion of transnational 
society, the pro-integrative activities of supranational organizations, and the 
growing density of supranational rules. … these processes gradually, but 
inevitably, reduce the capacity of the member states to control outcomes.”12 
 
This argument depictures an evolution of a relationship starting from 
intergovernmental politics towards supranationalist end, thanks to supranational 
                                                 
8 Puchala, D.J.(1999). Institutionalism, Intergovernmentalism, European Integration. p. 327. 
9 Moravcsik, A.(2008). European Constitutional Settlement. p. 167. 
10 Rosamond, B.(2000). Intergovernmental Europe? p. 284  
11 Puchala, D.J.(1999). Institutionalism, Intergovernmentalism, European Integration. p. 327. 
12 Sweet, A.&Sandholtz, W.(1997). European Integration and Supranational Governance. Journal of    
    European Public Policy, 4(3), p. 299. 
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institutions. Therefore, from this approach member states are the instruments of 
institutions, which will become supranationalist policy-maker, governing authorities. 
Concurrently, national governments’ autonomy will be obstructed and its competence 
will be diminished.13  
 
Both perspectives try to clarify the European integration by generally negating 
each other, especially on institutional reforms and the explanation they provide is the 
answer to ‘why it happened’. If institutionalist framework is accepted, the argument of 
the international bargaining leads to the creation of restrictions on national 
governments’ autonomy and narrowing competences of national governments should 
also be considered. National governments are the key actors in decision-making in the 
Council and the outcomes of this process constitute raw materials for EU institutions to 
operate. Thus possible restrictions would be the results of EU’s periodical institutional 
reforms and the current legislative instruments of EU would unveil the accuracy of 
institutional framework. However, this does not mean that the Commission and 
Parliament are insignificant and neutral factors in the EU legislation. On the contrary, 
both institutions have specified roles and influences. For instance, the Commision has 
an an agenda setting role since in several decision making procedures it has the power 
to propose changes. Similarly, the Parliament can help alter or bring in new ideas 
through its suggested amendments. Yet it is crucial to bear in mind that such roles of 
the Commission and  Parliament do not predominate Council's position in legislation.  
 
Therefore, this thesis’ scope is the legislative instruments of EU that are 
examined to find out their possible influences on member states’ autonomy and 
competences. Instead of looking for the answers of why and how questions, an analysis 
of the consequences and their impact on member states (what happened) is presented. 
Along this goal, first chapter introduces legislation mechanism in EU to the reader and 
second chapter starts this study with the legislative procedures of consent, assent, co-
operation and co-decision, in order to clarify national governments’ aim in extending 
co-decision procedure by determining the positions of both Parliament and the Council 
in legislation. Following an EU-level analysis, next chapter continues with the voting 
procedures as unanimity, simple majority and qualified majority that are used in 
                                                 
13 Puchala, D.J.(1999). Institutionalism, Intergovernmentalism, European Integration. p. 318. 
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decision-making in the Council’ for reflecting the possible positions of member states 
in accordance with ‘asymmetric policy interdependence’. Chapter four as an extension 
of the previous division questions the significance of voting weights and thresholds for 
member states’ power shares in voting and international bargaining. Finally, fifth 
chapter assesses vetoes of Spain and Poland on double majority voting in IGC 2003 in 
the light of the role of ‘asymmetric policy interdependence’ in international bargaining. 
It is crucial to emphasize that the outcomes of such analysis of each legislative 
instrument from 1951 till 2008 designate liberal intergovernmentalist explanation closer 
than institutionalists’ to the present situation. 
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CHAPTER OE  
 
Legislation in European Union 
 
In order to assess institutional reforms and their impacts on member states’ roles 
in decision-making, this chapter introduces the factors of legislation in EU. As an end 
result of this legislation mechanism EU law is formulated and it comprises from two 
types of legislations, which are primary and secondary legislations.14 Firstly, Treaties 
that forms the rules of legislation are issued as primary legislation and then actors, 
instruments and their correlative relations in legislation process such like Commission, 
the Council and the Parliament are summarized in the second part of this chapter under 
the heading of second legislation.  
 
1.1. Primary Legislation 
 
Institutions such as the Council or Parliament and various procedures of 
decision-making process are determined by the ‘primary legislation’ of EU, which 
stems from the Treaties. The Treaties can be differentiated under three categories: First 
two are Accession Treaties that are signed between the candidate state and the 
Commission and International Treaties that includes legal documents as trade, 
cooperation or association agreements signed with third countries and international 
organizations. Such Treaties do not formulate decision-making in EU, thus are left out 
of this research, in which aim is to scrutinize Accession Treaty in patches and the third 
category: Treaties that constitutes functioning of EU as a system. These Treaties 
specify mechanism of decision-making; however at the same time themselves are the 
consequences of intergovernmental process of bargaining between member states and 
each of them has to be ratified by all member states according to the process required at 
national level. In accordance to Article 48 of TEC, stated bargaining circumstances are 
created by the meeting called Intergovernmental Conference (IGC).15 IGC represents 
series of meetings of the member states’ representatives to negotiate crucial changes on 
EU’s institutions, Treaties and major agreements.16 IGC is concluded with the 
                                                 
14 European Commission. Sources of EU law.  
15 IKV.Intergovernmental Conference-IGC.  
16 Gilbert, M.(2004). A Fiasco but not a disaster: Europe’s search for a constitution. World Policy   
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European Council meeting, in which the Heads of State or Government sign the draft 
Treaties and start their ratification processes.17 Thus Treaty preparation period is 
completely an intergovernmental process. 
 
The Treaty establishing the European Atomic Energy Community (Euratom) 
and the Treaty establishing the European Economic Community (EEC) are known as 
the Treaties of Rome (1957). Yet, Treaty of Rome, which was renamed as Treaty 
establishing the European Community (TEC) is only reference to Treaty establishing 
the European Economic Community and excluded Treaty of Eratom. Treaty of Euratom 
was signed to control and coordinate the researches on nuclear energy in member 
states. Moreover, Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, Luxemburg and Netherlands as 
founding six member states sign TEC and Treaty enters in to force in 1958. Then in 
1967 as an amending Treaty, Treaty of Merger came to effect for the formation of a 
single Commission and a single Council of the then three European Communities. 
Another one was signed in 1986 and it embraces provisions on the completion of Single 
European Market in 1992 was signed also by new members as Denmark, Greece, Spain 
and Portugal under the name of Single European Act.  
 
Following these two amending Treaties, term of ‘European Union’ was firstly 
commenced to be used after ratification of Treaty of Maastricht (Treaty on European 
Union-TEU) in 1993. Treaty changed the name of the European Economic Community 
into ‘the European Community’ and Leal-Arcas argues that TEU ‘ 
 
“introduced new intergovernmental structures to deal with the aspects of 
common foreign and security policy, as well as police and judicial cooperation. 
The structure formed by these so-called Three Pillars (Community pillar; 
foreign and security policy; police and judicial cooperation) is the European 
Union, whose scope then became more overtly political as well as economic].”18 
 
Initial small steps on intergovernmental platform were taken on Common 
Foreign and Security Policy, yet Treaty was signed in 1992 to accomplish the creation 
of a monetary union as a next step afterwards single market. Furthermore, subsequent 
the enlargement to Austria, Finland and Sweden in 1997 third amending Treaty; Treaty 
                                                                                                                                              
    Journal, 11(1). 
17 Europa Glossary, Intergovernmental Conference. 
18 Leal-Arcas, R.(2006).Theories of Supranationalism in the EU. Bepress legal series.1790.p. 3. 
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of Amsterdam extended the scope of co-decision procedure together with qualified 
majority voting after two years delay of its signing in order to simplify the decision-
making. Though, a deeper alteration was required due to the largest enlargement of EU 
of 2004 with ten countries; Cyprus, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, 
Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Slovakia, Slovenia. Rearranging decision-making and other 
changes to adapt institutions to the enlargement were legislated by Treaty of Nice in 
2001. Qualified majority voting was again expanded and a new notion of ‘enhanced co-
operation’ was introduced to enable member states, which are willing to compromise 
on issues other member states disagree.19   
 
Right after Treaty of Nice became operational, attempts to prepare a 
constitutional treaty started, which comprised a crucial threat for liberal 
intergovernmentalism. The prepared draft of the Constitutional Treaty was signed in 
2004 and presented member states for ratification. It was a text that is planned to 
replace all Treaties and attains a single legal personality to EU under domestic and 
international law.20 Yet on account of the rejection of France and Netherlands, its 
ratification was not completed.21 In 2005, with 55% of vote against Constitutional 
Treaty French far left, far right parties and trade unions rejected the EU’s Constitutional 
Treaty.22 On the other hand, in Netherlands opposition had 61% of total votes, which 
comprised “Right-wing Pim Fortuyn party, Socialist Party, ChristienUnie and SGP, 
Christian parties” in 2005 referendum.23 
 
The Constitutional Treaty included the following changes;  
    •  inclusion in the text of the Treaty of the Charter of Fundamental Rights,  
    •  a new definition of the European Union to replace the current ‘European   
        Community’ and ‘European Union’ 
    •  a clearer presentation of the distribution of powers between the Union and the   
       Member States,  
        •  a revised institutional framework, clarifying the respective roles of the European  
            Parliament, the Council and the Commission,  
        •  more effective decision-making procedures”24  
 
                                                 
19 Ibid. 
20 Euractiv.(2004). Constitutional Treaty. 
21 Euractiv.(2006). Constitutional Treaty:’ the reflection period’. 
22 BBC News.(2007).EU Constition:Where member states stand. 
23 BBC News.(2005).Various reasons behind Dutch ‘No’. 
24 Eur-Lex, Process and Players.  
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After Constitutional Treaty’s failure, its content was rewritten as a Treaty, 
which amends founding Treaties, under the name of Treaty of Lisbon (Reform Treaty). 
It was signed in 2008. Treaty of Lisbon’s ratification process was completed in twenty 
five member states, but Czech Republic did not ratified yet and Ireland will have a 
second referendum possible before the end of October 200925, because of rejecting 
Treaty of Lisbon in its first referendum.26  
 
Overall, there have been eight IGCs till 2008. Five of them were held after 1985 
and the sixth (IGC 1996) concluded with the signing of Treaty of Amsterdam. The next 
IGC was held in 2000 for Treaty of Nice and in Treaty of Nice envisaged another IGC 
on 2004 to prepare a Constitutional Treaty. Finally the failure of Constitutional Treaty 
led to the organization of latest IGC 2007, which was concluded with the Reform 
Treaty.27 The long history of IGCs shows the existence of member state bargaining on 
each step of European integration that was sustained by the Treaties.    
 
1.2. Secondary Legislation 
 
Similar to primary legislation, intergovernmental structures are dominant in 
second legislation. The relationship between primary and secondary legislation depends 
on the determination of actors, relations between these actors and procedures that are 
used by these actors in decision-making by the provisions of the Treaties. In general, 
this mechanism called secondary legislation. Secondary legislation combines three EU 
institutions: European Commission, the Council and Parliament. According to 
procedures introduced by the Treaties, these three institutions are endowed to legislate 
as a group, in which the Council is the core and the Commission and Parliament are the 
assisting institutions.  
 
First of all, Commission was established as an executive organ of EU that 
implements adopted EU policies. Execution power and ensuring application of 
provisions of the Treaties by each member states attribute Commission the necessity to 
be objective; therefore it was founded as a supranational institution. Commissioners are 
                                                 
25 Vucheva,E.(2008). Ireland promises Lisbon ratification by the end of 2009. EUobserver.  
26 Euractive.(2008).The Treaty of Lisbon. 
27 IKV.Intergovernmental Conference-IGC.  
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nominated by national governments and by the approval of Parliament, the Council 
appoints. In addition, as Hosli underlines, Commission undertakes the responsibility of 
initiating legislation, which reinforces privileged power to the Commission.28 Member 
states do not have direct impact on the Commission for its initiative power or executive 
duty, yet the proposal can be revised by the Council unanimously. However, Moravcsik 
reminds that this capability mainly was moved to the European Council, in which 
member states vote in accordance to unanimity rule.29 Commission constitutes a crucial 
role in institutionalist framework. Puchala writes that Stone Sweet and Sandholtz 
believe in the influence of Commission on member states’ choices: “Commission 
initiatives ‘had an impact on member state thinking and preference formation’, and ‘if 
the interactions and discourses of the EU significantly shape state preferences, then 
interstate bargains are not what intergovernmentalists assume them to be.’”30 On the 
other hand, Commission is not capable to determine the conclusion of the act by 
influencing member states’ actions. Commission’s source of capabilities can be 
clarified by this reasoning; “... EU institutions are subtly designed with informal norms 
that encourage common policies while permitting governments to impede decisions and 
directives that threaten vital interest.”31 Thus initiated proposal of Commission offers 
areas/subject titles that could be agreed on and member states consider the issue along 
its preferences independent from the any influence of proposal. The conclusion is 
reached as a result of the bargaining including each member states’ interest.  
 
Likewise, Parliament was established as a supranational institution; however its 
members are directly elected by each member states and become one of the 785 
representatives to serve for five years. From Moravcsik’s perspective, Parliament is 
institutionally weaker then other two institutions.32 Parliament’s elections are 
decentralized, in which turnout is low. For instance, latest Parliament election of 2004 
was concluded with overall 45.6% turnout and as Table 1. indicates a decline in 
participation percentages of nine member states, which vary between 1.3% and 12.5%, 
in 1999 and 2004 elections. In the contrary, six member states’ participations were 
increased around 9% depending on the popularity of election campaigns held by 
                                                 
28 Hosli, M.(1995).The balance between small and large. International Studies Quarterly, 39, p.352. 
29 Moravcsik, A.(2008). European Constitutional Settlement. p. 167. 
30 Puchala, (1999). Institutionalism, Intergovernmentalism, European Integration. p. 321. 
31 Moravcsik, A.(2008). European Constitutional Settlement. p. 167. 
32 Ibid. p.172. 
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national governments. 2009 election will determine the latest direction of turnout, 
especially in cases of the ten new member states, in which participation in their first 
election varied between 16% and 82%.33 
 
Table 1. Decline in voter turnout in European Parliament Elections 
 
Source: Euractive. European Elections: Outlook for 2009. 
 
                                                 
33 Euractive. European Elections: Outlook 2009. For detailed information on each member states’ turnout  
    from 1979 election till 2004. 
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In addition, the ones, who attended Parliamentary elections, voted in accordance 
to their domestic issues, in stead of EU concerns.34 This conclusion is also apparent on 
one of the Eurobarometer’s survey question’s responses:  
  
 Figure 1. Source of Parliament’s decisions 
  
Source: European Parliament March 2008 Report.35 
 
41% percent of EU citizens think that the national preferences are advocated in 
Parliament by Ministers of European Parliament (MEPs), whereas 25% believes in the 
dominance of political standpoints’ of MEPs. Under such circumstances that lack 
knowledge on Parliament’s competences among EU citizens, Parliament maintains its 
existence among intergovernmental institutions. Its legislative role and competences 
change in accordance with procedure specified in Treaties. Concerns arisen on this 
issue as whether or not these procedures grant Parliament power to undermine 
Council’s role in legislation, yet what is the Council and what are its competences?       
 
The Council comprises national ministers, officials and diplomats, who act 
according to instructions from national governments.36 Council’s responsibilities are set 
under the categories of decision-making and co-ordination. In the scope of decision-
making, Council members are empowered to enact proposals with or without 
Parliament’s contribution. For this reason, Council meetings are held with respect to the 
issue under discussion and member states are represented by ministers responsible for 
                                                 
34 Moravcsik, A.(2008). European Constitutional Settlement. p. 172. 
35 European Parliament March 2008 Report. p. 21. 
36 Moravcsik, A.(2008). European Constitutional Settlement. p. 175. 
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that subject as agriculture, foreign affairs, and social affairs. Co-ordination duty 
provides Council the ability to organize joint-actions between member states. In 
general, coordination committees and the Council Secretariat’s duties are to enable 
efficient bargaining among member states.37 As an intergovernmental institution, 
overall the Council holds a wide autonomy to arrange bargaining among member states 
and benefits from the services of execution and legitimization provided by the 
Commission and Parliament.    
 
Consisting of two supranational and one intergovernmental actors pave the way 
to a complicated decision-making process. If a proposal is followed from the beginning, 
the path will be as such:  
Proposal’s formulization completed in the Commission and it is delivered firstly 
to General Secretariat of the Council. Furthermore, General Secretariat forwards the 
primary proposal to the Committee of Permanent Representatives (Coreper) of the 
Council. Coreper’s tasks are to organize and determine issues that will be debated in 
Council meetings.38 It consists of two groups: Coreper I and II. Deputy of the 
ambassadors to EU form Coreper I and Coreper II as a more important committee is 
constituted from ambassadors. Another distinction between these committees is issues 
they are dealing. Coreper I responsible from general matters such as environment, 
social affairs, internal market, transport, fisheries, consumer protection, education, 
culture39 and Coreper II handles topics in the scope of Councils for General Affairs and 
External Relations, Economic and Financial Affairs and Justice and Home Affairs.40 
Only for agricultural issues, another committee called ‘Special Committee on 
Agriculture’ prepares agenda for Council.41  
 
Coreper designates the relevant working group to send the proposal, whose task 
is to examine the proposal and to reach a proposition that can be agreed in The Council. 
Working groups under Coreper are comprised representatives of national governments 
such as officials from central administrations and also officials from the Commission 
join them in the meetings. As an outcome of discussions, a report is constructed and is 
                                                 
37 Ibid. p. 163. 
38 Treaty of European Union., Article 151.(1992).  
39 Lewis, J.(1998).Is the 'Hard Bargaining' Image of the Council Misleading?.Journal of Common   
     Studies, 36(4), p. 482  
40 EU-Oplysning, What is COREPER? 
41 Scadplus, Coreper.  
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sent back to Coreper to proceed. As a central office handling proposals coming from 
the Commission, Coreper officials decide as well if the proposal should be presented to 
the Council for legislation and whether it should be submitted under ‘A-point’ or ‘B-
point’. ‘A-point’ is a group of proposals, which can be resolved without debate in the 
Council, where ‘B-point’ proposals require discussions.42 In such meetings only 
member states’ in particular national governments’ preferences are open to dispute, 
there is no other factor that influence process in the Council except Parliament’s 
propositions, if it is required by Treaties.  
 
The process consists of the intergovernmental relations and various bargaining 
platforms. As Moravcsik’s reminder, the committees of Coreper ease the bargaining 
between member states and thus constitute a significant part of the Council. Moreover, 
details of the process include several legislative procedures that necessitate 
Parliament’s consent, assent or amendment as a result of the Treaties to proceed in 
legislation. Some of them should be processed by the Council before approval or 
rejection of the proposal; some are just parts of procedure on thesis. The Council waits 
for the opinion of the Parliament and at the end; the Council either handles seriously 
such opinions or neglects. 
 
If the legislative procedure requisites, the process continues as follows after 
Commission forwards the proposal to the Parliament:  
 
Similar to the working groups under Coreper, the relevant Parliament committee 
prepares reports on proposals. These committees are: 
 
•  Committee on citizens freedoms and rights 
•  Legal affairs committee 
•  Committee on women’s rights and equal opportunities 
•  Committee on agriculture 
•  Committee on fisheries 
•  Committee on foreign affairs, human rights, and common security 
•  Committee on regional policy, transport and tourism 
•  Committee on industry, external trade, research and energy 
•  Committee on economic and monetary affairs43 
 
                                                 
42 Hosli, M.(1996). Coalition and Power. Journal of Common Studies, 34(2), p. 4 
43 European Law Monitor, Consultation Procedure. 
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Report of the committee guides voting among MEPs and if an absolute majority 
is constituted, Parliament’s stance is presented to the Council. The process continues 
with voting procedure in one of nine the Council’ configurations, which are coordinated 
by Coreper: 
 
•  General Affairs and External Relations 
•  Economic and Financial Affairs 
•  Cooperation in the fields of Justice and Home Affairs (JHA) 
•  Employment, Social Policy, Health and Consumer Affairs 
•  Competitiveness 
•  Transport, Telecommunications and Energy 
•  Agriculture and Fisheries 
•  Environment 
•  Education, Youth and Culture44 
 
The result of the voting leads to the legislation of a new EU law or rejection of 
the proposal.  
 
Stated process above is presented as an instance to give the reader an overall 
idea of relationship between three institutions. Each legislative procedure contains its 
own processes and rules and therefore, roles of intergovernmental and supranational 
institutions changes from one subject to another. According to Hosli, alteration made 
on the scope of the legislative procedures gradually reduced power of the 
intergovernmental block that is represented by the Council, by increasing Parliament’s 
voice in legislation.45 In order to make comments on the positions of the Council and 
Parliament, legislative procedures as consultation, assent, co-operation and co-decision 
and their scope on the subject matters is going to be analyzed in detail.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
44 Council of the European Union, Council configurations 
45 Hosli, M.(1995).The balance between small and large. p. 3. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
 
Legislative Procedures 
 
 As Schulz and König underline the literature EU institutional reform had a 
remarkable impact on legislative ‘decision making.’ For instance, under consultation 
procedure they argue that Commission has its highest power, while co-decision 
procedure diminishes its influence in favor of the Parliament. Similarly, he emphasizes 
the ongoing discussion among scholars on the changing relative power of the Council 
as a result of institutional reforms.46 In this chapter, changing balance of power between 
the two EU institutions as the Council and Parliament is analyzed to clarify the 
consequences of national governments’ decisions under the name of institutional 
reforms. Legislative procedures’ mechanisms and their scope are determined by the 
Treaties and thus it is crucial to bear in mind that these are the outcomes of the 
intergovernmental process of bargaining between member states in IGCs. Respectively 
each legislative procedure as consultation, assent, co-operation and co-decision and 
their current scope are examined to point out the Council’s recent position in 
comparison to Parliament’s.  
 
2.1. Consultation Procedure 
 
Depending on Article 192 of EC Treaty, the Council is obliged to consult 
Parliament, if the issue is subjected to consultation procedure. Or Commission has right 
to ask Council to consult Parliament. However, either case does not compel the Council 
to take account Parliament’s opinion; seeing Parliament’s opinion on thesis would be 
enough for the Council to proceed on legislation of that act. The process continues as 
follows; the proposal is sent to Parliament, European Economic and Social Committee 
and Committee of Regions to get their opinions on the proposal. After receiving these 
opinions, Council can decide either to approve or reject the Commission proposal.  
Consultation procedure applies to various articles from these areas:  
 
•  agriculture 
•  competition rules 
                                                 
46 Shulz &König. p. 655. 
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•  tax arrangements47 
 
As can be seen from these three lines, the scope of the consultation procedure is 
remarkably limited. In addition, without getting into details of these issues, it is 
apparent that consultation procedure does not contribute any autonomy or competence 
to Parliament. As a procedure, Council is hold responsible to request Parliament’s 
consent with consultation procedure. Hence in practice, narrowing or expanding the 
scope of consultation procedure do not have any impact on roles of both Council and 
Parliament in decision making, rather it extends the process. 
 
2.2. Assent Procedure 
 
Assent procedure is introduced by Single European Act in 1986 and such issues 
are defined under assent procedure: Conclusion of association agreements and the 
analysis of the applications of candidate countries wish to be members of EC.48 Assent 
procedure was extended to several additional issues that require unanimity in the 
Council by TEU in 1992. However, Treaty of Amsterdam narrowed its scope to 
Structural Funds and Cohesion Fund.49 Assent procedure allows Parliament to point out 
its negative or positive approach on a discussed issue in the Council and in some cases, 
Council cannot approve a proposal without Parliament’s assent. The procedure operates 
accordingly: Council sends the proposal coming from Commission to the Parliament. If 
Parliament presents its assent by the absolute majority, which was required by Article 
192 of the EC Treaty, then the Council can approve that act. On the other hand, if 
Parliament does not approve or absolute majority cannot be constituted, measure cannot 
be adopted. From conspectus, this process seems like it provides a veto power to 
Parliament, yet maybe in order to hinder this probability, assent procedure includes an 
exit for the Council. If a positive outcome is needed, an interim report including 
recommendations on the proposal can be requested from Parliament by the Council and 
further debates with the Council can be issued. In addition, in this process Parliament 
does not hold a right to amend on a proposal should either approve or reject. 
 
In present assent procedure is effective on the following issues:  
                                                 
47 Europa, Decision Making in EU 
48 Eur-Lex, Process and Players 
49 EP website, Assent Procedure 
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•  enhanced cooperation (Article 11(2))  
•  specific tasks of the European Central Bank (Article 105(6)) 
•  amending the Statute of the European System of Central Banks (Article   
   107(5))  
•  Structural Funds and the Cohesion Fund (Article 161) 
•  uniform procedure for elections (Article 190(4)) 
•  certain international agreements (Article 300(3)) 
•  violation of human rights (Article 7 TEU)  
            •  accession of new Member States (Article 49 TEU)50  
 
Articles that are put under the assent procedure are not related to crucial 
conclusions, yet decisions cover a small part of community pillar as enhanced 
cooperation of several member states. As a result, independent from its scope assent 
procedure comprises limited influence for Parliament. On account of not being able to 
amend the proposal, but possessing a veto right, which can be resolved by further 
attempts of the Council, situates the position of Parliament under assent procedure. 
Attention given to consultation and assent procedure declines gradually and 
consequently, both procedures is proposed to be put together under the name ‘special 
legislative procedure’ in Treaty of Lisbon.51  
 
2.3. Co-operation Procedure 
 
As assent procedure, co-operation procedure is entered into force by Single 
European Act with Article 252 of EC Treaty. Co-operation procedure is more complex 
than previous procedures as can be seen in Figure 2.:  
Parliament after receiving Commission’s proposal, sends its opinion to the 
Council as first reading. Council reads all opinions coming from Parliament, 
Committee of Region and European Economic and Social Committee on the same 
proposal and reaches a common position. Later, Parliament analyses received common 
position as second reading. If Parliament approves the latest proposal or sends nothing 
back, Council is able to conclude the procedure with its common position. However, if 
Parliament rejects the common position with absolute majority, Council is obliged to 
adopt its common position by unanimity. On the other hand, if Parliament recommends 
amendments by absolute majority to Commission, Commission may agree with 
Parliament and include Parliament’s amendments to the initial proposal or may reject 
                                                 
50 Eur-Lex, Assent Procedure. 
51 Treaty of Lisbon, Article 249 A. 
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the amendments. If Commission agrees with Parliament, the renewed proposal is sent 
to the Council to get its approval to adopt the act or Council may reject the final 
proposal and fails the process. Nevertheless, if Commission does not accept the 
amendments, it still has to send the proposal to the Council. It may approve all of the 
Parliament amendments and adopt proposal by unanimity or without accepting 
Parliament’s amendments, it may adopt its common position by qualified majority.52  
Figure 2. Co-operation Procedure 
 
                                                 
52 Eur-Lex. Co-operation procedure. Process and Players.  
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Source: Eur-Lex. Co-operation procedure. Procedure and Players 
 
Currently few articles were left under the co-operation procedure as stated 
below, yet the rests were replaced by co-decision procedure by Treaty of Amsterdam: 
 
•  rules for the multilateral surveillance procedure (Article 99(5)) 
•  prohibition on privileged access to financial institutions (Article 102(2)), 
•  prohibition on assuming liability for Member States’ commitments (Article  
    103(2)) 
•  measures to harmonize the circulation of coins (Article 106(2))53 
 
As a result, Parliament has two readings in this procedure by which it can 
amend both the Commission proposal and common position of the Council. However, 
the scope of the co-operation procedure does not provide Parliament a wide and 
significant area to reflect its existence. Parliament’s position is seemingly reinforced by 
co-operation procedure, yet the remarkably limited scope of co-operation procedure 
neutralizes this influence on Parliament’s role without narrowing Council’s capabilities.  
 
2.4. Co-decision Procedure 
 
As the final and most expanded procedure, co-decision procedure went into 
effect by the TEU and it was extended by the Treaty of Amsterdam and Treaty of Nice. 
According to Article 251 of EC Treaty, co-decision procedure was determined as the 
core among the legislative procedures. It seems like the continuation of co-operation 
procedure, but it includes three readings instead of two.54 Procedure in co-decision 
operates by the following way:  
 
Like in co-operation procedure Committee of Regions, European Economic and 
Social Committee and as a result of its first reading Parliament send their opinions to 
the Council. If Council accepts the amendments as a whole or if Parliament approves 
the proposal, the Council adopts the act. If Council does not agree with Parliament 
about all of its amendments or Parliament does not accept the proposal, the Council 
prepares a common position by qualified majority. Then, the common position is 
conveyed to Parliament for the second reading. If Parliament does not act after the 
                                                 
53 Eur-Lex. Co-operation procedure. 
54 Eur-Lex, Co-decision Procedure.  
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second reading or approves the common position, the proposal is enacted. However, if 
Parliament rejects common position by absolute majority without amending, the 
measure rejected as a whole. On the other hand, if Parliament suggests amendments by 
absolute majority, Commission either agrees with Parliament or not and forward the 
final proposal to the Council. If the Council approves all of the Parliament 
amendments, it adopts the measure. If the Commission does not approve, the Council 
accepts whole amendment by unanimity to adopt the measure. In either case, if Council 
did not approve Parliament’s amendments, both institutions apply to the ‘conciliation 
committee’, in which Commission participates too. If an agreement reached Parliament 
should approve the result by absolute majority and the Council by qualified majority. 
Unsuccessful voting in the institutions or nonagreement outcome of conciliation 
committee leads to the failure of adoption of the measure.55 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
55 Eur-Lex. Co-decision procedure. Process and Players. 
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Figure 3. Co-decision Procedure  
 
Source: Eur-Lex. Co-decision procedure. Procedure and Players  
 
Co-decision procedure grants Parliament capability to amend proposal, yet most 
significantly Parliament is reenforced with the veto power on Council’s common 
position, which cannot be overlooked by unanimity voting. Worst case scenario for 
intergovernmentalists is the possibility of Parliament’s rejection without recommending 
amendments as a result of third reading; however it is unlikely to happen. Because, 
choosing not to discuss in the ‘conciliation committee’ and rejecting proposal would 
harm the credibility of Parliament, which is aimed to strengthen in the eyes of EU 
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citizens by extending co-decision procedure. Thus Parliament’s possibility to reject the 
proposal without applying to ‘conciliation committee’ is extremely low. Co-decision 
procedure requires direct cooperation among the Council and Parliament, whose duty is 
to enact member states’ specified goals with negotiations in an institutionally most 
optimum way.  
 
As stated before, in order to increase Parliament’s credibility there has been a 
gradual extension in the scope of the co-decision procedure. Firstly, TEU established 
co-decision procedure on these areas; right of establishment, right of establishment on 
services, the free movement of workers, the internal market, consumer policy; in the 
scope of incentive measures; health, education and culture, under the trans-European 
networks title’s guidelines, framework program of research and general action program 
of environment. In comparison to other procedures, its initial influence area was wider 
than the others’ and such subjects stem from the Community activities, which is 
described as “daily policy decisions within the broadly accepted goals”56. Moreover, 
issues of social exclusion, public health and the fight against fraud extended the 
influence area of co-decision procedure by Treaty of Amsterdam.57 Aim to designate 
the co-decision procedure as the standard procedure of decision-making system; it was 
expanded along the extension of qualified majority by Treaty of Nice. This widening 
included titles such as combating discrimination, judicial cooperation in civil matters, 
industry, economic and social cohesion (except Structural Funds), European political 
parties and visas, asylum and immigration.58 For the first time, cooperation on crime or 
police force related issues are embodied into co-decision procedure, but these 
inclusions were quite restricted.  
 
Final step in widening of co-decision procedure is proposed in Treaty of Lisbon. 
According to Treaty of Lisbon, co-decision procedure will be renamed as ‘ordinary 
legislative procedure’ without making any other changes on the procedure. 
Additionally, it broadens application of ordinary legislative procedure with thirty nine 
articles suchlike nondiscrimination, workers, services, capital and payments, policies on 
border checks, asylum and immigration, judicial cooperation in civil and criminal 
                                                 
56 Moravcsik, A.(2008). The European Constitutional Settlement. p. 167.  
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58 Scadplus, Codecision Procedure 
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matters, police cooperation, approximation of laws, economic policy, monetary policy, 
energy, tourism, civil protection, common commercial policy. In total, ordinary 
legislative procedure will be imposed on over seventy articles.59  
 
Currently issues extended to co-decision procedure do not include sensitive 
subjects for member states as taxation, defence or foreign policy. However, as the most 
extended legislative procedure, co-decision procedure creates a stronger institutional 
link between the Council and Parliament, which extends the process.  
  
 In addition, co-decision procedure removes Commission right to approve or 
reject Parliament’s amendment before Parliament’s communication with Council. As a 
result, a direct link is created between the Council and Parliament by co-decision 
procedure and reduced Commission’s influence in legislation. Warleigh asserts that 
Moravcsik considers this result as preservation Council’s superiority over Commission 
in legislation.60 Consequently, from this perspective member states did not delegate an 
additional competence to a supranational institution; they just rearranged positions of 
supranational institutions in co-decision in favor of the Parliament and in the expense of 
the Commission. However, it does not sufficiently explain Council intensions to extend 
Parliament’s roles. In addition, it is not the most efficient way of legislation, because as 
Schulz and König prove the time period of decision-making gets longer in the co-
decision procedure in comparison to others.   
 
Eurobarometer’s survey results present a possible answer to this question. One 
of the questions of Eurobarometer survey was “In your view, which of the following 
institutions should have the greatest decision-making power within the European 
Union?”61 Figure 4. illustrates that the highest percentage of responses was given in 
favor of Parliament with a large difference in each member state. The highest 
percentage of Parliament is 63%, whereas Council’s largest share is 18%. Thereby, this 
response can be considered as demand. Due to the entailment to fulfill domestic 
demands by national governments, national governments might have perceived this 
action in favor of them and agreed to approve the extension of co-decision procedure, 
                                                 
59 Robert Shuman Foundation.(2007). The Lisbon Treaty. p. 38-46 
60 Warleigh, A.(2002). Substantive Democracy and Institutional Change: The Paradox of Codecision.  
     p.6.  
61 European Parliament March 2008 Report. p. 21. 
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from which their vital interests are protected. Answers of survey question prove this 
domestic demand and in the meantime contribute Moravcsik’s argument of possibility 
of ‘delegating or pooling’, if there is a higher benefit to be achieved. 
 
Figure 4. Which institution should have the greatest decision-making power?    
 
 
Source: European Parliament March 2008 Report.62 
   
 Even if co-decision procedure does not require continuing compromise from 
member states, taking power of Commission and granting it in another shape to the 
Parliament is in the scope of delegating. Therefore, a different reason in addition to the 
aim to diminish Commission’s role is necessitated like increasing Parliament’s 
credibility in the eyes of the EU citizens for national governments’ account. 
 
 
                                                 
62 European Parliament March 2008 Report. p. 21. 
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2. Concluding Remarks 
 
Consultation and assent procedures do not contribute Parliament’s position, thus 
both of the Council position are not restricted in accordance to these procedures in 
decision-making. On the other hand, Parliament is granted amending act by co-
operation procedure that does not result in any change on the Council’s position either. 
Argument of Hosli can be refuted in each case of legislative procedures, especially for 
co-decision procedure, due to the low possibility of Parliament’s rejection of the 
proposal without applying to the conciliation committee for its credibility. In addition, 
it has the single impact as Schulz’s and König’s research asserts; Parliament’s 
participation to the procedure increases the time period of decision-making process.63 
 
By acknowledging distinct influence of the Parliament in EU legislation, it is 
remarkable that there has been no impeding progress in alterations of each legislation 
procedures to block Council’s autonomy or capability independent from member states’ 
conclusions. The parallel path that European integration and extension of co-decision 
procedure follow, endorses position of the Council as well as member states’ as 
pathfinder that determines institutions, roles of these institutions and instruments, 
which will be used by such institutions. Increase in the Parliament’s voice in decision-
making process is a part of a plan that reinforces member states from the domestic 
perspective. In addition, extension of co-decision procedure does not entail fade of the 
Council in decision-making process, yet only brighten a little Parliament’s face in the 
eyes of citizens.  
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CHAPTER THREE 
 
Voting Procedures 
 
Schulz and König approached to the institutional reforms from the perspective 
of time period of a proposal, which will become a provision. As a result, according to 
them its speed determines the efficiency of that reform. From this point of view, they 
stress the impact of voting procedures and instruments of secondary legislation in EU’s 
decision-making speed.64 Voting procedures are the consequences of primary 
legislation as legislative procedures. Not only their content cause bargaining between 
national governments, also their modifications and scopes are the products of 
bargaining process. Therefore, voting procedures and their extension are crucial to 
national governments to cooperate in accordance to their preferences. 
Intergovernmental platforms, in particular the Council, IGC and European Council 
cover all bargaining relations and interactions between member states. First of all 
bargaining in the Council requires national governments to consider their preferences. 
As Moravcsik aligns first stage of international cooperation is the preference formation 
and then bargaining comes as a second stage.65 This consideration at the first place 
constitutes the possible legal influence of an act on national law. Whether will it be 
binding to all member states or not? How will the method to apply the policy affects 
national law or not? Answers to such questions lie on the outputs of the Council’s 
decision-making that designate the impact area of the proposed policy.   
 
This chapter assesses firstly the instruments of second legislation to underline 
their meaning for member states. Then voting rules are analyzed in order to scan 
historically their influences on decision-making process and their scope would 
complete the examination that clarify whether or not all of these instruments can be 
define as obstruct for member states autonomy or capabilities.  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
64 Ibid. p.664. 
65 Moravcsik, A.(2008). European Constitutional Settlement. p. 158. 
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3.1. Outputs of the Council Decision  
 
Such instruments can be binding for every member states or just for one 
member state, to which the legislation is directed or non-binding at all depending on its 
definition: regulation, directive, decision and opinion.  
 
Firstly, a regulation is binding result of decision-making. Each member state is 
obliged to adapt that provision into its national system within the time period that is 
specified in that regulation. In addition, distinct from directive and decision, regulation 
is directly applicable; it does not allow changes that stem from the national differences. 
It should be applied into the national law as the provision indicates.66   
 
On the other hand, a directive is less normative in comparison to regulation. 
Directive should be addressed to a certain member state, due to the aim to use directive 
as aligning national laws. Only specified member state is hold responsible to fulfill the 
requested conditions by directive. Ways to reach that result is not crucial; it can be 
determined by the national government. However, if measure could not be fulfilled 
before its deadline as stated in the directive or it goes in effect incomplete, citizens of 
that nation can apply to national court for the directive’s application.67  
 
Thirdly, a decision is used to hinder a member state or an individual for 
performing an action or to grant a member state or an individual a right or compel for a 
measure. Therefore, decisions are similar to regulations in reasoning; it is binding for 
that member state or person, yet it should be designated individually, not be obligatory 
for everyone and does not require national implementation of a legislation.68   
 
Furthermore, a ‘recommendation’ is an instrument that can be used to maintain 
communication between institutions and member states or with other institutions. 
Without creating any legal obligation, institutions can present their suggestions to a 
specified address by recommendations. Similarly, an ‘opinion’ is close to 
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recommendation. It is non-binding instrument to state an institution’s idea on a 
question.69  
 
Among these instruments, regulation constitutes great power to the Commission 
to enforce that specified conclusion. Thus the process to enact a regulation gathers full 
attention of national governments. On the other hand, a directive only influences one or 
several member states, which can be define as a threat for those member states. 
Because of adopting such provisions by bargaining, negotiations are concluded 
according to the relative power of member states. In addition, influence of decision 
does not endanger any member states’ sovereignty, on account of not necessitating 
implementation of a provision on national law. Consequently, both recommendation 
and opinion comprise neutral elements on national governments.  
 
Additional to such instruments, the Council is capable to create a ‘joint action’. 
It is introduced in TEU with the definition of coordinated action of member states that 
are agreed to use all of their resources to reach a common goal.70 The Council may 
adopt a joint action unanimously and regulate its implementation by qualified majority 
(if it is decided by unanimity to vote by qualified majority), yet the outcome is binding 
for all member states. Likewise, ‘framework decisions’ are stated firstly in TEU on 
issues of police and judicial cooperation in criminal matters. It works just like a 
directive; it is binding for all member states and how to achieve that determined 
objective is left to national governments. Finally, ‘common position’ is specified by the 
Council unanimously to present a collective approach of member states to a given 
proposal or a question.71  
 
Consequently, such instruments do not constitute any threat for capability and 
autonomy of member states, because these cannot be one of the Stone Sweet and 
Sandhlotz’s ‘supranational rules’ that impede member states. According to these 
outputs, as Schulz and König’s research present the results of “shorter proposal-
decision time lags” of regulation and decision, whereas directive requires longer time 
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period due to its necessity to change the national law.72 Thus, decisions are more 
significant than other outputs.  
In addition, the legal representation of the act determines the initial influence on 
the approach of a national government, which is concentrated on the ‘distribution of 
benefits’73. If a member state’s preference fall under the influence area of that specific 
provision, a second issue comes into the picture; its voting procedure. In the Council, as 
stated before some proposals are defined by Coreper as B-point to be debated in the 
Council meetings. Discussions on such proposals and national preferences of each 
member state on that specific subject form the bargaining circumstances. Bargaining 
process proceeds with voting in the Council meeting and it is renewed until member 
states reaches to a common conclusion in accordance to that voting rule. In addition, 
unlike instruments of secondary legislation, widening the scope of a certain voting 
procedure such as qualified majority or double majority voting may turn into one of the 
supranational rules, if it is permitted. Therefore, voting procedures constitutes a 
stronger impact on member states approach to the issue.   
 
3.2. Rules of Voting Procedures 
 
As it is determined by the Treaties, the Council has currently three different 
broadly used voting procedures as unanimity, simple majority and qualified majority 
and one final voting procedure that was proposed in Treaty of Lisbon called double 
majority. Each procedure’s rule determines the circumstances of bargaining and 
autonomy of national governments in voting. 
 
All EU member states have one vote under unanimity. In spite of this equality, 
unanimity is met by the approval of all members, which makes the process harder. Thus 
one rejection fails the proposal and that confers each member state a kind of a veto 
power. As a result, it requires each member states’ satisfaction and persuasion to vote 
in favor to amend an act. It is being used since 1957, Treaty of Rome. Almost all 
decisions are taken unanimously until 1986, Single European Act. However, unanimity 
paves the way to problems in Council meeting among members, especially in 1965. In 
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1965, French protest called ‘empty chair crises’ led to detain decision-making process. 
Replacement of unanimity role with qualified majority voting in several articles, in 
particular clauses related to agriculture is one of the trigger reasons of this protest.74 
Unanimity is the only voting procedure that comprises the circumstances for member 
states to reflect their preferences as in a mirror on to voting by granting them a veto 
vote. 
 
On the other hand, according to simple majority rule each member has equal 
voting weights and 51% of total votes was determined as threshold to adopt a decision. 
Simple majority is defined as unweighted majority. As unanimity, this procedure 
depends only to membership footing in allocation of votes without making any 
differentiation according to their population. However, simple majority necessitates a 
coalition formation, in order to defend its national interest; one should be a part of the 
winning side. It can be either side that approves or rejects, because blocking minority’s 
threshold is also 51% of the total votes. Therefore, significance of the coalition 
formation comes forth as future’s tradition. Coalition formation is easier in simple 
majority rule than other majority procedures, due to the distribution of same vote 
weights to each member state. Thus simple majority procedure constitutes more choices 
for coalition formation.  
 
In contrast, qualified majority procedure is more complicated than simple 
majority both in the formation of a coalition and blocking majority. Unlike simple 
majority, qualified majority operates on the basis of weighted vote, which has been 
changed several times by the Treaties. Distribution of votes sometimes favored big 
states with high population, sometimes small states depending on relative power of 
national governments in bargaining then. For instance, in 1958 the smallest country 
Luxemburg had 1 vote and the largest country Germany had 4. These numbers were 
increased in 1973, 2 as minimum and 10 as maximum amounts. Finally, it reached to 
the range from 3 to 29 votes.75 Additionally, overall the threshold has been roughly two 
thirds of the votes, if the act is initiated by the Commission proposal. On account of 
varying voting weights and higher thresholds, coalition formation were getting difficult 
                                                 
74 ‘Empty chair crisis’ See page 31. 
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and it becomes harder to reflect the national interests on voting especially for small and 
middle sized states. However, enlargements caused problems in allocation and 
alteration of qualified majority voting became an issue for a long time.     
 
Nevertheless, the last place on this alignment would belong to double majority 
procedure. Double majority was introduced firstly by Treaty of Nice in 2001; however 
it is rejected. The Constitutional Treaty included this proposal, yet it did not ratify and 
reintroduced with Treaty of Lisbon, which did not enter into force yet. It designates 
majority depending on two separate conditions; member states’ votes and EU 
population. Thresholds of 55% of member states’ votes that is supported by 65% of EU 
population fulfill the double majority. Inclusion of an additional variable into 
calculations obstructs coalition formation for small countries, due to their small 
populations. Double majority voting is either encouraged or rejected, it depends on the 
territory. Germany’s point of view would be strongly in favor of this application, due to 
its high population rate; however, Luxemburg would not benefit from this procedure, in 
contrast double majority diminishes its relative power. 
 
Between these procedures, national preferences can be exactly reflected by 
unanimity as if it is on a mirror. Therefore, the highest level of member state’s power 
can be acquired under unanimity procedure, and then their roles diminish due to the 
restrictions stemming from voting procedures. Respectively simple majority, qualified 
majority and double majority could be put on a line of closeness of the measure of 
reflection of state preferences. However, intergovernmentalism envisaged this decline 
as the costs of the cooperation among increasing number of member states, which is 
lower than the benefits that are acquired.76 On the other hand, Stone Sweet and 
Sandholtz may see this as weakening of authority of member states on the conclusions. 
Because, not all of the national governments are able to defend their national 
preferences under qualified majority rule and as an evolution member states’ will lose 
their control.  
 
Analysis of the consequences of each alteration on voting procedures and 
extensions or narrowing on their scope asserts the dominance of member states 
                                                 
76 Moravcsik, A.(2008). European Constitutional Settlement. p. 163. 
 33 
preferences and bargaining between them. When it is moved from unanimity rule 
towards double majority rule, roles of member states are started to vary from each 
other, on account of the increasing in details/conditions. Unanimity constitutes 
individual member states and their preferences; however majority voting rules compel 
member states to act as a group for cooperation. In accordance, there has been an 
increase in the number of options offered to national governments. A common role for 
valid for each voting procedure cannot be defined for member states, due to the various 
relative powers of member states. Nevertheless, unanimity rule requires each member 
state to either approve or reject, there is no need for further negotiations to form a 
coalition. In case of simple majority, choices are either to join the winning coalition or 
blocking coalition. In addition to these two choices, qualified majority voting presents 
national governments the capability to create distinct exits from common provisions. 
The choices of national governments increase, whereas their relative powers changes 
accordingly. Nevertheless, developments experienced inside EC/EU borders bring 
changes; enlargements and other circumstances led to the extension of qualified 
majority voting by narrowing unanimity’s scope.  
 
3.3. Allocation of Voting Procedures on Subject Titles 
 
3.3.1. Unanimity and Simple Majority 
 
In 1957, Treaty of Rome announced unanimity as the central voting procedure 
and till 1965 decisions were taken according to unanimity rule. EC was consisting of 
six member states during this period and agreement on the basis of unanimity was an 
obtainable result for a group of six states. In present, conformity among 27 member 
states on one specific issue is close to impossible; therefore implication of unanimity to 
all titles would stop decision-making in the Council as it was experienced in 1965 with 
‘empty chair crisis’.  
 
According to Treaty of Lisbon, only these issues will be subjected to unanimity: 
anti-discrimination measures, defence, taxation, creation of a European Public 
Prosecutor, employment law, the multi-annual financial framework, own resources and 
 34 
treaty revisions. 77 Furthermore, fifty four decisions are proposed to be moved to the 
qualified majority voting from unanimity. These articles are related to energy, 
intellectual property, social security for migrant workers, judicial cooperation in 
criminal matters, structures of Eurojust and Europol, culture and urgent financial aid to 
third countries.78 However, Treaty of Lisbon did not ratified yet and Treaty of Nice is 
still valid to keep these clauses under the procedure of unanimity.  
 
On the other hand, simple majority is not operational widely; just several 
articles are subject to simple majority rule. It would ease the voting procedure, but it 
stipulates equal votes to all member states, which ignores population differences among 
member states as between Germany and Malta. For sometime, weighted votes were 
distributed according to the negotiations between member states, then as a result of 
ongoing enlargements a fixed formula which is acceptable for all member states, was 
trying to be formulated. At this point, population rose as a variable in the allocation. 
However, simple majority does not represent differences among member states in itself. 
Consequently, it was introduced only on general provisions of EURATOM Treaty and 
TEC; however today its usage is limited with these four articles:  
 
•  determine organization of Council’s General Secretariat’s by Council (Article  
    207 EC)  
•  request for a research on a possible common objective  (Article 208 EC) 
•  determine rules governing the Council committees (Article 209 EC) 
•  collecting information and controlling performances of tasks (Article 284  
    EC)79  
 
Due to the impossible practical application of unanimity in the Council 
consisting representatives from 27 member states and the necessity to present member 
states’ differences on votes, unlike simple majority, qualified majority voting arises as a 
remedy for irregular functioning of decision making in the Council. On account of this 
reason, qualified majority has been extended by Treaties and unanimity and simple 
majority were kept as voting procedures respectively on sensitive and insignificant 
subject matters. Focusing on the qualified majority’s broadening releases the choices of 
member states during each widening period and such choices enlighten whether or not 
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actually there has been a gradual decrease on the control of member states’ on 
conclusions independent from their actions.   
 
3.3.2. Qualified Majority Voting 
 
Qualified majority is the number of votes required to approve a decision in the 
Council. According to Schulz and König, qualified majority voting declined the 
legislation’s time period, which supports their efficiency theory.80 Majority thresholds 
are determined by votes allocated to member states that are arranged according to 
weighted votes, which have been changed four times till 2008 and another proposal is 
waiting on the line for the ratification of Treaty of Lisbon. The scope of qualified 
majority was extended by each Treaty and the latest proposal offers broadening of 
qualified majority to forty policy areas.81 Its widening is crucial to both sides of 
Moravcsik and Stone Sweet and Sandholtz and presented different approaches 
explaining the causes, yet the analysis of consequences from the historical path defends 
Moravcsik’s perspective.  
 
3.3.2.1. Treaty of Rome 
 
In the establishment of EEC, unanimity was determined as the central voting 
procedure; however Treaty of Rome designated some articles to come under the scope 
qualified majority or determined movement of several articles from unanimity to 
qualified majority with conditions as application of qualified majority rule after the first 
stage or second stage of the transitional period or by the completion of the transitional 
period of internal market. The subject matters were:  
 
•  discrimination on grounds of nationality (Article 7) 
•  free movement of goods (after transitional period) (Articles 28) 
•  agriculture (after 2nd) (Articles 42, 43) 
•  free movement of persons, services and capital (after 1st or 2nd stages)    
    (Articles 54(2), 55, 56(2), 57, 63(2), 69, 70(2), 73(1) Original Treaty) 
•  transport (Articles 75(1) (after 2nd stage), 79) 
•  common rules on competition, taxation and approximation of laws (Articles      
    87(1) (after 3 years), 92(3), 94, 98, 101(after 1st)) 
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81 Euractiv.(2007).The ‘Treaty of Lisbon’.  
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•  economic and monetary policy (Articles 103, 108(2), 108(3), 109) 
•  common commercial policy (after 2nd stage or transitional period) (Articles     
    112(1), 113, 116, 127) 
•  provisions governing the institutions (Articles 154, 203, 203(3), 203(5), 204,    
    206, 206(b))82  
 
Initially qualified majority voting was started to be used on areas such as 
discrimination depending on nationality, economic and monetary policy and rules to 
administrate Community institutions. Additional clauses were envisaged to enter into 
force under qualified majority; after the first stage several articles from free movement 
of persons, services and capital; following the second stage on issues related agriculture 
and common commercial policy; at the end of the transitional period as free movement 
of goods. From the number of articles under each heading, it is presumed that during 
those times member states endeavor for creation of credibility between themselves, 
which would lessen the cost of cooperation and ease the evolution towards the 
establishment of internal market. In addition, may be to facilitate the transition to 
qualified majority voting, it was introduced in Treaty of Rome, yet was planned to put 
into force gradually on articles related to common market. On the other hand, as a new 
organization EEC was required to be improved institutionally and on account of not 
being directly linked to national preferences couple of articles on operation of EEC’s 
institutions was defined under qualified majority rule.  
 
In Treaty of Rome, member states were relatively freer than today to act 
according to their national interests and thus experienced several tough obstacles in 
front of them during negotiations, because of having few numbers of members and 
starting a new relationship/communication among member states, each of which is the 
rule maker of EEC. During these circumstances, baby steps were also taken on the 
subjects of agriculture, free movement of goods and transport, which would be widen 
by succeeding Treaty as a result of twenty nine years long negotiations.  
 
3.3.2.1.1. ‘1965 Empty Chair Crisis’ 
 
All other subjects were introduced under unanimity rule. Six founding member 
states acted together on the rest of the issues until a brake down in 1965, French protest. 
                                                 
82 For detailed information, see Appendix, Table 2. 
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Approaches of member states during 1957 permitted future arrangements to extent 
qualified majority, but implementation of these provisions were entrusted to the 
perspectives of member states in 1960s. The election of French President, Charles 
De’Gaulle in 1958 initiated sharp negotiations in Council meetings. According to 
Mazey, De’Gaulle wanted to diminish the EEC influence on national governments and 
challenged the mechanism of the Commission, due to his suspicions about the 
formation of supranational institutions over nations and future plans of France.83 As a 
result, he created a kind of an alternative of EEC called ‘Fouchet Plan’ and proposed it 
to the Commission in 1959. This was a political ‘union of states’ that requires 
cooperation on foreign policy and defense. 84 In De’Gaulle’s first draft of proposal, 
regular meetings of six states’ foreign ministers were proposed, in which political 
issues would be discussed. However, crucial points for other member states were the 
positions of France and UK in this plan. France rises as an independent state among 
America and Russia and as a leader that unites Europe. It excluded UK in order to 
impede the influence of America on Europe using its relations with UK that had been 
seen as the ‘Trojan Horse’ of America by De’Gaulle. His first attempt was concluded 
by the formation of an impermanent consultation mechanism among foreign ministers 
of member states without determining its scope or aim, due to the constraints stemming 
from Dutch opposition.85 Therefore, between 1960 and 1962 he continued his struggle 
with an additional draft. De’Gaulle’s new institution operates as follows: Regular 
summits would be supported by a parliament consists of national officials and by 
referendum.86 Vanke claims that Netherlands rejected this draft due to its concerns 
about the erasure of statuesque in Europe that was creating in economic arena by EEC 
and in defence by NATO. In addition, he argues that Netherlands did not want to 
exclude UK from discussions especially on issues connected to defence and security, 
which was also the member of both NATO and Western European Union (WEU)87.  
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85 Ibid. 
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If Fouchet Plan would have been actualized, foreign ministers of six member 
states would come together and take decisions in the absence of UK. Among various 
reactions to Fouchet Plan, Netherlands sustained its opposition. At the same time, 
De’Gaulle continued his negotiations with all members and agreed to include articles to 
protect EEC institutions and relations with NATO into Fouchet Plan. However, UK’s 
first application for EEC membership led to the modification of the Fouchet proposal 
by De’Gaulle in 1962. In this renewed draft, there was no reference to NATO, inclusion 
of which was strongly supported by Netherlands.88 Netherlands defended its mistrust on 
France by presenting De’Gaulle’s latest act as a proof and paved the way to the collapse 
of the Fouchet Plan.89  
 
As a result, this tension caused the 1965 ‘empty chair crisis’ which is known as 
a turning point in EU decision-making. On account of the failure of Fouchet Plan, 
De’Gaulle maintained his strong opposition to so called supranational formation by 
using discussions in meetings to canalize French interests in to EEC decisions. For 
instance, discussions on Common Agricultural Policy (CAP), which came into force in 
1962, was one of the means of De’Gaulle.90 CAP was planned to erase damages of 
World War II in agricultural production by increasing productivity, sustaining standards 
of life for agrarian population, keeping food prices stable in member states’ markets 
and France was the biggest beneficiary member.91 Another reason for De’Gaulle’s 
opposition was the application of qualified majority voting in the Council voting 
starting from January 1966 on the grounds of third stage of transitional phase.92 
Teasdale underlines that according to De’Gaulle the qualified majority voting would 
strengthen the Commission.93 Consequently, in 1965, Walter Hallstein, Commission 
President between 1958 and 1967, proposed a document that grants Community the 
right of creating its own budget independent from member states; gives budgetary 
powers to Parliament (Assembly then). As a result of all these reasons, De’Gaulle did 
not accept these changes by presenting justification of influences of this proposal on its 
sovereignty and blamed Hallstein with reaching conclusions on budgetary proposals 
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without sufficiently consulting to national governments’ and acting like the President of 
the Europe.94 On the other hand, De’Gaulle could not venture confrontation of other 
member states about CAP due to qualified majority; because CAP was approved by all 
members with France’s hard work to convince each member state with negotiations.  
 
Especially French Presidency of Council proceeded with disagreements. In June 
1965, De’Murville, who was the French Foreign Minister then, ended negotiations on 
agricultural policy’s financial regulations and it was declared that French Permanent 
Representatives would not attend the meetings until French perspective was 
acknowledged.95 This protest continued till January 1966 and consequently, in those six 
months decision-making in Council was almost stopped. In January 1966, an agreement 
was reached, which is known as ‘Luxemburg Compromise’. As a political declaration, 
it did not amend Rome Treaty. During negotiations of Luxemburg Compromise, French 
opposition to qualified majority voting was broken with the pressure of other five 
member states and foreseen articles, which were planned to be included to qualified 
majority after the completion of transitional period in Treaty of Rome, became 
operationalized. However, the following right was granted to France as all other 
member states: 
 
"Where, in the case of decisions which may be taken by qualified majority vote 
on a proposal of the Commission, very important interests of one or more 
partners are at stake, the Members of the Council will endeavor, within a 
reasonable time, to reach solutions which can be adopted by all the Members of 
the Council while respecting their mutual interests and those of the 
Community"96  
 
According to this paragraph, member states were enabled to block the 
enforcement of a specific provision that stems from a Commission proposals, for a 
‘reasonable time’; until unanimous agreement is reached. In addition, proposal on 
creating ‘own resources’ was postponed until 1970, including Parliament’s greater 
budgetary power by this agreement. Consequently, France could not obtain everything 
that was requested, yet was granted with a veto power on conclusions approved by 
qualified majority rule to revote that proposal according to unanimity rule.  
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Teasdale underlines that in practice Luxembourg Compromise was not 
influential on decision-making. Subjects that restricted application of qualified majority 
voting were ‘technical decisions on the CAP and the adoption of Community’s 
Budget’.97 Nevertheless, no one was able to convince member states to widen the scope 
of qualified majority voting until 1986, Single European Act. As a result, national 
preferences continued to block extension of qualified majority voting for twenty years.  
 
3.3.2.2. Single European Act 
 
The Single European Act (SEA) was signed in 1986 and came into force in 
1987. In order to abolish tariff barriers and similar restrictions on trade and to create 
European standards on domestic regulations as it was stated in 1985 EC Commission 
White Thesis, the first part of SEA covered articles on free movement of goods, 
persons, services and capital in EEC.98 On the other hand, regulations that would ease 
decision-making in the Council constituted the second part of SEA. Easing instrument 
was defined as qualified majority voting and its scope was expanded to the clauses 
primarily related to single market. In addition to single market, new areas under 
Community actions such as social policy, economic and social cohesion, research and 
technological development and environment were also introduced to qualified majority 
rule by SEA.  
 
•  internal market (Article 8b) 
•  free movement of goods (Article 28) 
•  free movement of persons, services and capital (Articles 57(2), 59(2), 70(1)) 
•  transport (Article 84(2)) 
•  common rules on competition, taxation and approximation of laws (Articles  
    100a, 100b) 
•  social policy (Article 118a) 
•  economic and social cohesion (Article 130e) 
•  research and technological development (Article 130q(2)) 
•  environment (Article 130)99 
 
Overall, five new clauses on economic and social issues entered to ECC 
mechanism with qualified majority rule and inclusion of total of twelve articles 
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eliminated the blockage over the expansion of qualified majority, which would lead to 
closer cooperation among member states that brought higher benefits. 
Experiencing profound French opposition in 1965 that nearly stopped decision-
making, revealed the first sparks of the clash between one national interest and so 
called ‘EEC objectives’ that were determined by the same member states. Generally, 
initial five member states defended ‘EEC objectives’ against French rejections and 
following Luxemburg Compromise together with the new members; Denmark, Greece, 
UK, Ireland and Portugal, several articles on single market were moved to qualified 
majority voting for the first time by SEA. Previous conclusions of the founding 
member states were maintained by both old and new members under the new 
circumstances. Another crucial point is that member states took one step further in 
cooperation by including clauses independent from single market such as research and 
technological development and environment. Integration on various areas as research 
and environment, on which cooperation was necessitated due to the reason of not being 
able to act as an individual state to acquire better results, but rather act as a group.  
 
3.3.2.3. Treaty of Maastricht 
 
The next crucial step for EEC was the signing of Maastricht Treaty, which is 
known as Treaty of European Union (TEU) after six years, in 1992. TEU came into 
force in 1993 and had broaden the scope of qualified majority on new subject titles as 
public health, trans-European networks, consumer protection and development 
cooperation. In total of thirty articles were either introduced or moved from unanimity 
to qualified majority voting: 
 
•  free movement of persons, services and capital (Articles 73c, 73f, 73g) 
•  transport (Article 75) 
•  common rules on competition, taxation and approximation of laws (Article  
    100c) 
•  economic and monetary policy (Articles 103(2), 103(4), 103(5), 103a(2),  
    104a(2), 104b(2), 104c(6-14), 105a(2), 106(5-6), 109(1-4), 109(3), 109c,  
    109f, 109h, 109i, 109j, 109k) 
•  education, vocational training and youth (Articles 126, 127) 
•  public health (Article 129) 
•  consumer protection (Article 129a) 
•  trans-European network (Article 129d) 
•  research and technological development (Article 130i(4)) 
•  environment (Article 130s) 
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•  development cooperation (Articles 130w, 138e) 
•  institutions of the community (Articles 194, 228(1-2), 228a)100 
 
The greatest expansion was experienced under the economic and monetary 
policy titles. Due to the initiation and preparations of European Monetary Union 
(EMU)101 in EU, the highest number of clauses that were sent under the qualified 
majority voting was related to operation of the system in EMU. Economic integration 
was started with TEC and was planned to deepen with establishment of EMU by TEU. 
On the other hand, another significant development was the transformation from the 
Economic Community to Union. TEU enacted ‘European Union’ by setting new 
configurations on EU institutions. In addition, cooperation on the basis of free 
movement of persons, services and capital were sustained to be widened by the 
inclusion of additional clauses related to this subject.  
 
Most significantly TEU contained two new articles introduced to qualified 
majority as Article J.3(2) and Article K.3(2)b.102 According to the Treaty, joint actions 
can be voted by qualified majority rule, only if this is unanimously agreed in Council. 
Joint actions are categorized under Second and Third pillars of EU; Common Foreign 
and Security Policy and Justice and Home Affairs. Importance of this enabling lies on 
the intergovernmental structure of these pillars.  
 
Bargaining was maintained to be the core of the decision-making and national 
governments negotiated their preferences in IGC 2000 to approve the Treaty of Nice. 
This bargaining process concluded with the creation of an exiting instrument on 
specified issues just for addressed member state, in order to complete the legislation 
process. By this way, UK was granted an ‘opt-out’ from the third stage of EMU, thanks 
to its relative power. An opt-out provides a special right of not joining to a specific 
common measure to only addressed member state.103 UK did not replace its national 
currency, pound, with euro as it is required in the third stage of EMU.104 However, as 
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stated before bargaining process does not end until the Treaty becomes operational. On 
account of Danish rejection on TEU in the first referendum in 1992, Denmark sat on 
the negotiation table again and received an opt-out from EMU. This opposition grants 
Denmark opt-outs from four common structures of EU, under the name of ‘Edinburgh 
Agreement’. The titles were EMU, European Security and Defence Policy, Justice and 
Home Affairs and citizenship of European Union.105 On account of these opt-outs, in 
the second Danish referendum in 1993 TEU was ratified. However, Denmark’s opt-out 
from citizenship of EU became redundant; because of inclusion of a sentence to Treaty 
of Amsterdam; EU citizenship do not replace national citizenship.106 Similar to 
Luxemburg Compromise, the opt-out mechanism provides Council the ability to move 
on in the case of a tough opposition and member states’ to be able to protect their 
preferences as possible as its relative power enables. Member states’ preferences 
continued to reshape presented instruments and created new ones in legislation, thanks 
to bargaining process.  
 
UK’s opt-out reminds Moravcsik’s concept of ‘asymmetric policy 
interdependences’. He defines the interdependence as follows; “Patterns of 
interdependence underlie credible threats to veto, exit and exclude other 
governments...”107 From this point of view, it is apparent that UK’s interdependence on 
the single currency policy is lower than the other member states. Therefore, British 
national government requested for the opt-out. On the other hand, it is not the case for 
France. France found itself the most benefiting state from EMU, thus French 
interdependence was higher than UK.108 As a result of this differences on approaches to 
the policies, a member state which does not interested in cooperation on that policy, can 
force other national governments to provide itself an exit from that policy by using the 
threat of veto.  
 
As can be seen from Danish cases even if it is assumed that an agreement is 
reached by signing a Treaty, bargaining may not be completed. Referenda that are 
required by member states’ national laws may become one of the trump cards of that 
member state. This trump card is the threat of veto as in the case of ‘asymmetric policy 
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interdependences’. By the impact of this veto threat Denmark was granted opt-outs on 
four policies. TEU was a significant step for member states and they agreed to extent 
the influence of EEC with new configurations of EU. Overall, the new mechanism in 
the EU enable flexible integration, thus not all member states compelled to obey all 
collective measures. Member states are still authoritative on conclusions from both 
sides of cooperation formation and exit from these compromises.  
 
3.3.2.4. Treaty of Amsterdam 
 
Treaty of Amsterdam granted new exits to UK and Ireland. In 1997, UK 
negotiated for another opt-out and Ireland followed UK. These two members sat on the 
table for opt-outs from Schengen agreement, which would erase border controls 
between member states.109 UK presented the reason of not being able to stop 
transnational crimes by using Schengen Information System, in order to be left out on 
the implementation of Schengen. However, Ireland asked for the opt-out on, due to its 
agreement with UK called Common Travel Area.110 As a result, two more opt-outs 
became operational on Schengen agreement addressed to UK and Ireland with Treaty 
of Amsterdam.  
 
Furthermore, as proving the argument on the creation of exits for member states, 
Treaty of Amsterdam enclosed a similar instrument called ‘emergency brake’. This 
instrument allows a member state to block implication of a measure in its country 
without affecting procedure on other member states.111 Firstly, that provision should 
have been approved by qualified majority rule in the Council. Then, the member state 
may apply European Council and presents its reasons on why this measure includes 
vital and sensitive implications on its national policy, in order to ask for annulment of 
this measure just for itself. However, this request is voted in European Council by 
unanimity, thus it requires eligible reasons and a strong representative to convince other 
representatives of member states to vote in favor.112  
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From other way around, offering another exit to member states should stem 
from new regulations on cooperation among member states. As expected, Treaty of 
Amsterdam came into force in 1999 by broadening qualified majority with twenty four 
articles. These articles were:  
 
•  agriculture (Article 37(4)) 
•  free movement of persons, services and capital (Articles 40, 46, 62) 
•  economic and monetary policy (Articles 128, 129) 
•  common commercial policy (Articles 135) 
•  social policy, education, vocational training and youth (Articles 137(2),  
    139(2), 141(3)) 
•  public health (Article 152(4)) 
•  research and technological development (Article 166(1), 166(2), 172) 
•  provisions common to several institutions (Article 255) 
•  financial provisions (Article 280) 
•  general and final provisions (Article 285, 286, 299(2)) 113 
 
As in Treaty of Rome, agriculture and common commercial policy were 
widened with additional clauses in the scope of qualified majority vote; other subjects 
are the same as in the expansion of TEU. In addition, Treaty of Amsterdam renews 
articles related to joint actions in Common Foreign and Security Policy by Article 23(2) 
and cooperation on the field of Justice and Home Affairs by Article 34(2). As point of 
origin, emergency brake is applicable on these articles.  
 
Treaty of Amsterdam’s most important role in the extension of qualified 
majority was introducing emergency brake on several articles. The scope of the 
extended articles mostly covered Community activities and the significant two on joint 
actions present member states an exit by emergency brake or negotiations determine 
opt-outs beforehand. 
 
3.3.2.5. Treaty of ice 
 
Operational failures in EU institutions became significant problems, on account 
of the upcoming largest enlargement of EU with ten countries in 2001. Negotiations 
were continued to find out solutions as to be able to ‘absorb’ ten new member states in 
EU institutions. As a result of tough bargaining, Treaty of Nice was completed and 
                                                 
113 For detailed information see Appendix, Table 5.  
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presented for ratification. However, due to the Irish rejection in their first referendum, 
Treaty could be operationalized in February 2003.114 Two Mediterranean; Cyprus and 
Malta and eight Eastern block countries as Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, 
Lithuania, Poland, Slovakia and Slovenia became members of EU in 2004. In order to 
maintain decision-making in the Council and preserve superiority of powerful members 
(i.e. France and Germany)115, voting weights of each member states were rearranged 
and threshold of qualified majority was changed, in accordance to bargaining in IGC 
2000. 
 
Such alterations in Council contained also the expansion in the scope of 
qualified majority voting and this extension became the largest one in the EU history. 
Forty six clauses were either introduced or moved to qualified majority:       
 
•  provisions on a Common the Foreign and Security Policy (Articles 23(2), 24,  
    27(c), 27(e)) 
•  provisions on cooperation in the field of Justice and Home Affairs (Article  
    40(a)) 
•  provisions on the institutions (Article 17 TEU) 
•  citizenship of the Union (Article 18) 
•  free movement of persons, services and capital (Articles 63(1)(a), 63(1)(b),  
    63(1)(c), 63(1)(d), 63(2)(a), 65(a), 65(b), 65(c), 66) 
•  economic and monetary policy (Articles 100(1),100(2), 123(4)) 
•  common commercial policy (Article 133(5)) 
•  social policy, education, vocational training and youth (Article 137(2)) 
•  industry (Article 157(3)) 
•  economic and social cohesion (Articles 159, 161(1), 161(2), 181a) 
•  provisions governing institutions (Articles 190(5), 191(2), 207(2), 210, 214,   
    215, 223(6), 224(5), 225a(5), 247(3), 248(4), 259(1), 263) 
•  financial provisions (Article 279(1))116 
 
As Treaty of Amsterdam, Treaty of Nice renewed content of the articles related 
to joint actions on Common Foreign and Security Policy and Justice and Home Affairs 
and accreted several clauses on joint actions to qualified majority voting. The number 
of articles under each title emphasizes matters as operations of institutions and free 
movement of persons, services and capital. Necessity of reconfiguration of institutions 
was supported by articles under the title of provisions governing institutions. British, 
                                                 
114 Jones,R.(2003). Institutions and enlargement under the Treaty of Nice. p.3.  
115 Baldwin, R.&Widgren, M.(2004).Winners and losers under various dual-majority voting rules for the  
      EU’s Council of Ministers. p.23. 
116 For detailed information see Appendix, Table 6. 
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Danish and Irish opt-outs were still valid and emergency brakes were applicable on 
joints actions on the grounds of Common Foreign and Security Policy and Justice and 
Home Affairs.  
 
Treaty of Nice did not make a crucial difference as introducing new subject 
areas to extension, yet it widened its scope on the present issues. Therefore, there were 
no significant clauses that could affect national preference to create additional exits.  
 
3.3.2.6. Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe 
 
Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe (TCE) diverges from other 
Treaties, on account of not amending founding Treaties and being created as a 
constitution. It was signed in 2004 and would have come into force in 2006. However, 
after ratification of TCE by eighteen member states, France and Netherlands rejected 
the Treaty by referenda. Because of these two rejections seven member states (UK, 
Ireland, Portugal, Poland, Sweden, Czech Republic and Denmark) decided to postpone 
their ratification process.117 As a result, European Council members were invited to 
negotiations about the future of TCE under the name of ‘period of reflection’.118 In 
2007, cancellation of TCE was agreed by member states and preparations for a new 
treaty draft, which would amend TEU and TEC, was initiated. By the end of the year 
2007, this prepared Treaty draft was signed as Reform Treaty or Treaty of Lisbon. 
 
Even if TCE was not ratified, the intentions were to be actualized were carried 
into Treaty of Lisbon such as ordinary legislative procedure, double majority and 
expansion of qualified majority rule119.  
 
3.3.2.7. Treaty of Lisbon 
 
Rejection of TCE led to the creation of Treaty of Lisbon and ratification process 
continued, even though Ireland presented its first rejection to Treaty of Lisbon with its 
referendum in June 2008. Treaty of Lisbon was signed in December 2007 and would go 
                                                 
117 Euractiv.(2005).Ratification of EU Constitution.  
118 Euractiv. (2007).Constitutional Treaty: ‘the refection period’. 
119 For detailed information see Appendix, Table 7. 
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in effect in January 2009. However, Irish rejection postponed this date as in Treaty of 
Nice.  
 
As it was decided in TCE, Treaty of Lisbon includes alterations on threshold of 
qualified majority rule. Unanimity will only be valid for sensitive issues such as foreign 
policy, defense and taxation. Therefore, clauses from almost every title are moved to 
qualified majority rule in Treaty of Lisbon.  
 
•  provisions on the institutions (Articles 15, 16, 18 TEU) 
•  specific provisions on Common Foreign and Security Policy (Articles 45, 46   
    TEU) 
•  non-discrimination and citizenship of the Union (Articles 24 TEU) 
•  policies on border checks, asylum and immigration (Articles 77, 78,79 TEU) 
•  judicial cooperation in civil matters (Article 81 TEU) 
•  judicial cooperation in criminal matters (Articles 84, 85 TEU) 
•  police cooperation (Article 88 TEU) 
•  transport (Article 91 TEU) 
•  approximation of laws (Article 118 TEU) 
•  monetary policy (Articles 129, 133 TEU) 
•  education, vocational training and youth (Article 165 TEU) 
•  culture (Article 167 TEU) 
•  research and technological development (Article 189 TEU) 
•  energy (Article 194 TEU) 
•  civil protection (Article 196 TEU) 
•  common commercial policy (Article 207 TEU) 120 
 
Treaty of Lisbon’s extension comprises articles on various titles as police 
cooperation, border checks, asylum and immigration or judicial matters by encouraging 
cooperation. Police cooperation enables member states to share experiences and 
information on the platform called Europol. Extended article allows member states to 
determine the general functioning of Europol by embodying just the surface of the 
subject. Division on policies on border checks, asylum and immigration underlines the 
cooperation on this subject, from which UK and Denmark have opt-outs. Finally on 
judicial cooperation, the articles include the Eurojust’s functioning as Europol. 
 
Overall, each article provides national governments’ higher benefits as a result 
of the compromises on Community activities such as energy, transport, research and 
technological development etc. and especially judicial and police cooperation are 
                                                 
120 For detailed information see Appendix, Table 8. 
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determined as initial steps of further cooperation, which are envisioned to bring higher 
benefits than its costs. 
 
3. Concluding Remarks 
 
The list of articles extended to the qualified majority exemplifies the path of the 
subjects that are envisaged to cooperate around. Articles are on the historical line 
expanded to firstly economic cooperation, then environment, later security related 
issues as immigration and free movement of people until this point121; details of these 
issues are generally in favor of member states that are powerful in bargaining/relative 
power is higher. This delineated path is directly determined by the preferences of each 
member state and their bargaining; if a member state argues that cooperation depending 
on determined conditions is vital to its national law or social system, thanks to the 
adequate number of allies negotiations may continue in favor of this member state. Or it 
could proceed with that specific country’s ongoing objection depending on the 
asymmetric interdependence among member states and the usage of a threat of veto as 
a trump card lead to the application of exit instruments such as opt-outs or emergency 
brake. There are many other various conclusions or paths of relationships in bargaining, 
yet neither of voting procedures or their allocation constitutes any restriction on 
member states’ capabilities or autonomy. If any member state feels an obstruction 
stemming from the qualified majority voting’s expansion, it is able to negotiate in 
accordance with its preferences without any legal restriction. As a result, extension of 
qualified majority and other voting procedures becomes both the influencer elements 
and the outcomes of member states’ actions.  
 
Consequently, the qualified majority or other voting procedures are not the legal 
instruments to restrict member states’ control on conclusions. There is a potential of 
voting procedures to become a supranationalist rule that impede member states, yet 
analysis on the scope of them does not provide a proof to support this argument. In 
contrast, member states are maintaining their authority in the system through 
international bargaining and various differences as asymmetric policy interdependence 
that lead to the compulsion of the limits of the intergovernmental platforms to be 
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flexible. Thus international bargaining becomes tougher for national governments and 
their relative powers increase its significance.  
 
As a trump card for several member states, ‘asymmetric policy 
interdependences’ becomes one of the decisive factors in relative power. From 
Moravcsik’s perspective, negotiators search ways to increase their relative power in 
order to be able to raise their share from the distribution of benefits.122 That links the 
issue to another legal instrument, allocation of voting weights.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
122 Moravcsik, A.(2008).The European Constitutional Settlement. p. 163. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
 
Voting Weights and Thresholds 
 
A fair calculation for all voting weights’ was trying to be formulated for a long 
time, yet the member states’ desire to get the most from the distribution of benefits 
extended this process. Each member state would like to get the highest weight in order 
to be more influential in Council voting. The historical path follows changing allocation 
of voting weights and in relation altering thresholds of qualified majority rule reflects 
bargaining between member states. In order to be able to obstruct member states’ 
control as institutionalism envisages, formulation of a specific calculation would be 
needed in determination of voting weight and flexibility provided by bargaining should 
be erased. However, until today debates to create such formula show the ongoing 
dominance of bargaining, thus member states’. This chapter divides this path into two; 
1957-1999 and 2000- periods. Finally, Nice and Constitutional Treaty rules are 
compared to highlight Spain’s and Poland’s positions in these discussions as instances 
of middle-sized member states.  
 
4.1. 1957-1999 
 
Initially, voting weights were determined in 1957 by TEC. On account of the 
bargaining depending on ‘the combination of population, economic power, historical 
precedent and political reality’123 among six member states, voting weights were 
distributed as follows: Germany, France and Italy 4, Belgium and Netherlands 2, and 
Luxemburg 1. Ade underlines that the allocation did not depend on a formula; in fact 
the four large member states were given equal weights in spite of the wide difference of 
population up to 20 million.124 As a rule qualified majority required 12 votes in total of 
19 votes to adopt a decision on a proposal from the Commission, but if it was not the 
case, these 12 votes should come from at least four member states. When these 
conditions were considered, Luxemburg did not have any influence or voting power, 
whereas Germany and France already have eight votes together; to approve a proposal, 
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      Law.74 p. 583. 
124 Ade, F.(2005). Decision making in Europe. p. 4. 
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alliance of Germany, France and Italy would be enough. Therefore, it is apparent that 
coalition of Germany, France and Italy constituted always the winning side till 1973. 
However, as Felsenthal and Machover underline qualified majority voting did not 
envisage to be operationalized until 1966 and till 1972 decisions cannot be voted by 
qualified majority rule, due to the Luxembourg Compromise.125 In addition, following 
the first enlargement of UK, Denmark and Ireland the reconfiguration on voting 
weights led to the erasure of the case of great states’ ability to fulfill qualified majority 
threshold. Nevertheless, this enlargement causes deep and long debates between 
member states beforehand.   
 
In August 1961, UK applied for EC membership, in spite of its decision not to 
be one of the founding members, because of its doubts on the establishment of 
supranational institution, which was adopting common enforcements on member states 
on areas such as, market regulations, trade and agricultural production (CAP).126 
Denmark, Norway and Ireland joined UK in this application process. As Hosli stresses 
unanimity was a procedure that favors opposition states, one state’s vote is enough to 
fail the proposal.127 Similarly, De’Gaulle used his veto power to hinder the first 
enlargement attempt depending on the argument of believing that UK would act as a 
spy of US in EC. Thus UK, Denmark, Norway and Ireland’s applications were 
suspended. In 1967, the second attempt of UK was also rejected by De’Gaulle by 
putting forward the reason of British lack of political will to form a strong Europe. 
Within the limits of unanimity rule, France was opposing UK’s existence in EC. There 
was no bargaining process to persuade France to vote in favor, yet according to 
Moravcsik France had its reasons to decrease its credibility by misusage of its veto 
power. French oppositions to UK’s membership were perceived as the consequence of 
the aim to preserve its position as a powerful country.128 In addition, bringing forward 
economical reasons was the front side of the curtain for Moravcsik. Behind this seen, 
he embeds geopolitical interest of De’Gaulle and exerts the superiority of geopolitical 
benefit over the economic interest with this sentence; “economic integration is not an 
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end in itself but a means to manipulate ‘high politics’.”129 He explains his argument by 
stating that if only economic preferences support state’s geopolitical interests or 
ideology, then that economic choice becomes an action.130 As a result, De’Gaulle’s 
ideological and geopolitical approaches to British membership obstructed this 
enlargement for twelve years. Finally, in 1973 UK, Denmark and Ireland became 
members of EC, whereas Norway’s application was also accepted, but its membership 
was rejected in referendum by Norwegians and is still not a member of EU.  
 
Consequently, the first enlargement of 1973 set qualified majority threshold to 
41 out of 58 votes, as a result of new distribution of voting weights among member 
states. Population of member states were determined as the basis of the calculations and 
states, which fell under the same range, received same voting weights as it is presented 
in Table 2.: 
France, Germany, Britain and Italy had 10, Belgium and Netherlands got 5, 
Denmark and Ireland 3 and Luxemburg was granted 2 votes. Moreover in 1981 without 
changing initial calculations, Greece was received 5 votes, due to its population of 9,7 
mil. Nevertheless, in order to ensure 71% quota out of 63 total votes, the threshold was 
raised to 45 votes. Southern enlargement of 1986, by which Spain and Portugal became 
members, total number of votes increased to 76, while 54 of them constituted qualified 
majority. Spain’s population of 38,4 mil provided itself 8 votes, whereas Portugal with 
9,9 mil. population received 5 votes like Greece. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
129 Ibid. p. 27 
130 Ibid. p. 29 
 54 
Table 2. Population in thousands and voting weights in the Council  
 
Source: Felsenthal,D.S.&Machover,M.(1997). The weighted voting rule in the EU’s Council of 
 Ministers, 1958-1995. p.34. 131 
 
Unhindered superiority of original states was removed in 1973 alterations and 
qualified majority voting was started to be used more often. France, Germany and 
Italy’s shares in the total of votes presented a steep decrease from 23.53 % (1958-1973) 
to 13.16 (1986).132 Southern enlargement of 1986 raised the threshold to 54 and created 
24 votes difference between forty votes of original states. Even inclusion of UK to 
larger states was not sufficient to meet the threshold of qualified majority. They 
constituted forty votes in total, thus they needed one additional ally in each voting. 
furthermore, in the case of none Commission proposal, 41 votes should be composed 
by six member states out of nine members that requires two allies to form a winning 
coalition for larger states. Most significantly, Hosli’s asserts that enlargement of EC to 
12 member states led to the drop on the power indexes of larger states as from 0.238 to 
0.129 and middle sized states as Belgium and Netherlands from 0.143 to 0.067.133 As a 
result, consequences of the enlargements till 1990s on voting shares of large and middle 
size states comprised parallel results as remarkable decrease.  
Such decrease due to the accession of small and medium sized states led to 
creation of concerns for larger states as loosing influence on voting during TEU’s 
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negotiations; therefore a proposal that aimed to increase votes of larger states’ was 
prepared. Nevertheless, following the late ratification of TEU, European Council 
reached to the conclusion of redundancy to renew allocated votes just for couple of new 
states. Concerns formed a discussion of either to base voting weights to ‘one country, 
one vote’ or population principle.134 Before the accession of three EFTA members, 
larger member states maintained stating their concerns as UK and Spain. Both states 
did not support an increase on the quota of blocking minority. With the accession of 
three small members, blocking minority threshold became 26 instead of 23. According 
to Hosli, UK was still concerned about the possible influence on its sovereignty. 
Felsenthal supports Hosli’s approach by arguing that the higher threshold of qualified 
majority voting would favor UK more than Germany, due to British oppositions on 
several proposals. Germany has had the same voting powers with UK, yet it enabled 
UK to obstruct the proposal by voting against.135 On the other hand, Spain’s worry was 
related to the richer northern block’s accession, which would change exclude 
preferences of southern block, in particular Spain’s. Negotiations on these concerns 
paved the way to resolution of 1994 called ‘Ioannina Compromise’. As Luxemburg 
Compromise, Ioannina Compromise is described as gentleman’s agreement and it was 
readjusted after Norway’s rejection of membership. This agreement grants a right to 
group of rejecting member states representing votes between 23 and 26 to hold the 
decision-making process for a specific act, which threatens vital interest of these 
member states. However, those member states assure to ‘do within its power within a 
reasonable space of time, to reach a satisfactory solution that can be adopted by at least 
68 votes out of 87’.136 Treaty of Amsterdam enabled the continuation of Ioannina 
Compromise till the next enlargement and it was abolished by Treaty of Nice. As a 
result, in 1995 Austria, Finland and Sweden memberships’ were approved.  
 
Overall, Felsenthal claims that from 1958 till 1995, larger states as Germany 
were always granted higher weights; however disproportionate distribution of voting 
weight was favored small and medium sized states.137 Moreover, he emphasizes that the 
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quota of qualified majority voting was kept around 71% from 1958 till 1995.138 
Consequently, concerns of larger states and debates on the threshold of the blocking 
minority formed the circumstances of negotiations for IGC 1996. However, during IGC 
1996 member states did not come cross to an acceptable system for all and postponed 
the issue to IGC 2000. IGC 2000 is held under the Presidency of France and systems 
proposed to resolve the problem of voting weights were not satisfactory to convince all 
member states. Nevertheless, France presented a last minute proposal and persuaded 
member states one by one to vote in favor.139 As a result, Nice rules adopted without 
looking into details of the mechanism.    
 
4.2. 2000 - 
 
According to 2001 Treaty of Nice, Nice voting rules would be in effect in 
November 2004. The rules that determine voting during six months between May 2004 
and November 2004 are called Temporary Accession Treaty voting rules.140 During this 
period, previous qualified majority rules was maintained without changing any of the 
thresholds of qualified majority or blocking minority. Approval of a proposal depended 
on 71% of the total 15 member states’ votes (88 of 122 votes), which was 68 out of 87 
and blocking minority should be consist of 26 votes. Then in November 2004, the 
voting mechanism of the triple majority system, which is also known as Nice voting 
rule went into effect. According to the Treaty, triple voting covers the period between 
November 2004 and November 2009, during which the Council was going to approve 
proposals by 74% of the Council votes with the member threshold 50% of members (13 
members in EU-25), and the population threshold 62% of the EU population.141 
Baldwin and Widgren claim that the EU leaders realized the inefficiency in Nice rules 
and decreased the threshold of 74% of Council votes to 72.2% (232 of 321 votes) by 
the Accession Treaty.142 However, following the Bulgaria and Romania accession in 
2007, threshold for the Council votes was planned to be increased to the same level of 
74% (255 of 345 cotes of EU-27) and the others conditions would stay the same as 
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simple majority of member states (14 members of EU-27) and 62% of EU population 
by the Draft Council Decision relating to the implementation of Article I-24 in the 
Accession Treaties.143 Apart from determined conditions, Nice rules was set in favor of 
larger and near-large states such as Spain and Poland by granting them disproportional 
increase on their voting weights.144 The Nice distribution of votes is presented in the 
following Table 3: 
Table 3: The Distribution of votes and the decision quota in the Council 
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144 Baldwin, R&Widgren, M.(2004). Council voting in the Constitutional Treaty. p. 2. 
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Source: Hosli, M.&Machover,M.(2004).The Nice Treaty and Voting Rules in the Council.145  
 
In June 2004, the Constitutional Treaty was accepted by all member states. 
According to the Treaty text, weighted vote system of Treaty of Nice was going to be 
replaced by the double majority voting. The winning coalition under double majority 
rule should consist of 55% of member state votes and 65% of EU population. In 
addition, two criteria added at the last minute, if it approved by more than fifteen 
member states’ votes and four member states was required to block a proposal. Kauppi 
and Widgren prove that the condition of requiring fifteen members for approval made 
membership quota redundant due to the representation of fifteen members as 55.6% of 
the total membership.146 Constitutional Treaty was envisaged to enter into force in 
November 2009, yet as stated before, signing of a Treaty does not prove that the issue 
is resolved.147 Bargaining process may continue and it was experienced with 
Constitutional Treaty’s ratification process as a result of the rejection of France and 
Netherlands’ referendums. Even though the failure of Constitutional Treaty paves the 
way to the formation of Treaty of Lisbon and as a result of the negotiations double 
majority rule inserted into the Treaty of Lisbon’s text.  
 
Historical path of allocation of voting weights shows the creation of additional 
differences among member state’s voting powers depending on asymmetric policy 
interdependence. Enlargements compelled national governments to change the 
calculations, yet this led to a long debate and become a significant problem to resolve. 
What were the reasons of these tough discussions? What was the role of Nice rules in 
this debate and what difference Constitutional Treaty’s rule create?  
 
4.3. The ice Treaty vs Constitutional Treaty 
 
Nice voting rules constituted a rise around 3.5% in total of voting weights of 
Spain and Poland equal to the increase in four larger states’ weights, while small and 
medium sized states’ ratios were decreasing.  
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Figure 5. Reweighing of Council votes 
   
 
 :otes: The squares represent the each member states’ Council votes applicable until November 2004 and the circles    
 show the votes determined by Treaty of Nice. The line indicates the percentage increase between the two.   
 D: Germany, GB: Great Britain, F: France, I: Italy, E: Spain, Pl: Poland, NL: Netherlands, Gr: Greece, CR: Czech  
 Republic, B: Belgium, H: Hungary, P: Portugal, S: Sweden, A: Austria, SR: Slovak Republic, DK: Denmark, Fin:  
 Finland, Ire: Ireland, Li: Lithuania, La: Latvia, Slo: Slovenia, Es: Estonia, Cy: Cyprus, L: Luxemburg, M: Malta     
 Source: Baldwin,R&Widgren,M.(2004).Council voting in the Constitutional Treaty, Devil in Details. p. 3. 
 
Figure 5 shows that increase granted to Spain and Poland by Treaty of Nice 
comprised the highest percentage. However, largest four states’ percentage was also 
remarkable by around 180%. The greatest losers were three of the small states as 
Latvia, Slovenia and Estonia, because the smallest three states received 100% increase 
on their weights. Baldwin and Widgren by underlining manual determination of French 
Presidency to resolve the voting weights problem in Treaty of Nice argue that Latvia, 
Slovenia and Estonia was not able to defend their rights with 1 to 2 million people.  
 
Nevertheless, this picture changed remarkably due to the rejected Constitutional 
rule.  
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Figure 6. Winners and losers, big versus medium-sized and small member states 
 
 
  :otes: Big-4 = Germany, the UK, France, Italy; medium nations (populations of 25 to 5 million) are Romania, the 
  Netherlands, Greece, the Czech Rep., Belgium, Portugal, Hungary, Sweden, Bulgaria, Austria, Slovak Rep.,     
  Denmark and Finland; small nations (populations less than 5 million) are Ireland, Lithuania, Latvia, Slovenia, 
  Estonia, Cyprus, Luxembourg and Malta.   
  Source: Baldwin,R&Widgren,M.(2004).Council voting in the Constitutional Treaty, Devil in Details. p. 4. 
 
According to Baldwin and Widgren’s calculations, larger states’ power share as 
a group raised by 3.5%, when Spain and Poland’s share decreased at the similar 
percentage by Constitutional rule. In the mean time, middle sized states’ ratio declined 
at the same proportion of the rise in the small states’ percentage. In particular, boost in 
the power share of larger four states by Nice rules became loss of middle sized and 
small states. Next proposed jump in Constitutional rule, in larger four states share 
stemmed from the decrease on the shares of Spain and Poland. Consequently, in general 
larger states’ slice from the cake was increasing gradually at the expense of middle 
sized and small states.  
 
One exception was experienced on the Spanish and Polish shares as a result of 
the bargaining power of Spain then. Spanish President Aznar’s rejection to the voting 
weights allocation in Treaty of Nice reopened negotiation with French President. Aznar 
did not accept determined low increase on Spanish share, while four big states’ voting 
powers were raised by 3.5%. Negotiations were concluded by the victory of Aznar and 
3.5% rise was granted to both Spain and Poland. Because of this reason, Baldwin and 
Widgren define this increase as Aznar Bonus.148 The greatest benefiting country from 
these negotiations was Poland, because Poland was not even a member of EU, its 
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accession date was May 2004, yet due to its close population number to Spain, Poland 
benefited from this bargaining. Nevertheless, Constitutional rule diminished Spanish 
and Polish total weight even lower then the pre-nice period. This is explained as 
‘Zapatero Compromise’.149 Zapatero was the successor of Spanish President Aznar, his 
acceptance of this decrease on its voting weight, directly influenced Poland’s weight 
and both of their shares was proposed to be reduced.        
 
Figure 7. Winners and losers by member: Nice rules and Lisbon rules 
 
 
 :ote: Change in percentage points. 
 D: Germany, GB: Great Britain, F: France, I: Italy, E: Spain, Pl: Poland, NL: Netherlands, Gr: Greece, CR: Czech  
 Republic, B: Belgium, H: Hungary, P: Portugal, S: Sweden, A: Austria, SR: Slovak Republic, DK: Denmark, Fin:   
 Finland, Ire: Ireland, Li: Lithuania, La: Latvia, Slo: Slovenia, Es: Estonia, Cy: Cyprus, L: Luxemburg, M: Malta     
 Source: Baldwin, R&Widgren,M.(2004).Council voting in the Constitutional Treaty, Devil in Details. p. 5. 
 
Final, circumstances is successfully represented in Figure 7. Proposed 
distribution of voting weight in Treaty of Lisbon will provide a significant percentage 
of increase to Germany; nevertheless gains of the other three large states as UK, France 
and Italy are slightly lower then the small states’ account. All of the other member 
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states’ share will face a fluctuating decline, some of which will be close to -1.1% as in 
Greece, Czech Republic, Belgium, Hungary and Poland. However, the greatest loser 
from in this picture will be Spain and Poland by -2.0% and -2.1% of decreases.  
 
If these two phases are put together, the greatest winner becomes Germany with 
4.3% increase and the unluckiest states are Spain and Poland with shares that fall down 
from positive to negative side. On the other hand, middle sized states’ shares increases 
in negative numbers, only three smallest states’ shares are equalized at the -0.1%.  
 
4. Concluding Remarks 
 
The dominance of larger states over middle sized and small states in voting 
weights negotiations, may be maintained due to the coherence between the criteria of 
voting weight allocation and larger states peculiarities as higher population. However, it 
is crucial to bear in mind that these allocations are both raw materials and the outcomes 
of bargaining processes. Pollak asserts that “The position of the member states is not 
dependent on their size, but largely influenced by their ability to form alliances and 
forge compromises.”150 and ‘Aznar Bonus’ is a clear instance of this argument. 
Capability to form coalitions using its relative power constitutes the heart of the 
navigator that situates the position of that member state in negotiations. Yet, size may 
become a crucial instrument of bargaining in competent hands as in the Germany case. 
Nevertheless, ‘Aznar Bonus’ and ‘Zapatero Compromise’ present the changing 
positions of different two member states in bargaining process. Size of a member state 
should be seen as an instrument that can create favorable circumstances for each 
member state.  
 
Currently, there is no acceptable calculations that benefit all to replace Nice 
rules, yet it is being tried that to resolve through negotiations and the usage of 
‘asymmetric policy interdependence’ as instruments. This attempt was accomplished in 
the case of Zapatero, yet there are other opposition member states as Poland. Next 
chapter issues vetoes of Spain and Poland on double majority voting, in order to show 
how the circumstances can change perceptions and preferences of member states, 
                                                 
150 Pollak, J.(2004). Democracy and the European Constitutiton: Majority Voting and Small Member 
States. ConWEB, 4. p. 16. 
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which leads to the impotence of institutionalist idea of diminishment of the member 
states’ control.  
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CHAPTER FIVE 
 
Vetoes of Spain and Poland in IGC 2003  
 
Previous chapter compared Nice and Constitutional rules and clarified 
consequences of these rules on voting weights of the member states. Nice rules 
provided Spain and Poland higher voting weights in the expense of middle sized and 
small member states, whereas larger states’ shares were also increased at the same 
percentage. However, Constitutional Treaty aimed to remove these disproportionalities 
among member states and rearrange the voting weights on the grounds of population 
and membership. How come this conclusion became the resolution that was acceptable 
for all member states, especially when Spanish and Polish power shares were 
decreasing around the percentage of 2?  
  
 In this final chapter, Spain and Poland’s crucial positions in the formation of 
latest voting rule of qualified majority is scrutinized to clarify the issued factors’ 
influences on member states’ actions. Constitutional Treaty’s bargaining consequences 
are followed by the possible factors that may have an impact on the positions of Spain 
and Poland as distinct policy interdependences, qualified majority voting rules and 
domestic politics.  
 
5.1. Bargaining Constitutional Treaty Rule 
 
Member states realized the harm caused by Nice voting rules on decision-
making, in particular by 74% threshold to approve a policy. Therefore, a European 
Convention was proposed to be held in 2003, which leads to the formation of a draft 
Constitution to solve the so called ‘Nice leftovers’.151 The convention method is used 
by member states to assure transparency on discussions by including all related 
institutions such as the Parliament and the Commission, observers from Coreper and 
the Economic and Social Committee and national government representatives both 
from members and candidate states into the debates.152 Consequently, after sixteen 
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months discussions among participants the so called draft Constitutional Treaty was 
prepared and the draft Constitutional Treaty of IGC 2003 was presented representatives 
of member states.  
 
According to this draft, weighted voting of Nice Treaty is replaced by double 
majority voting that requires 50% of member states votes, which constitutes 60% of EU 
population. In addition, blocking minority is expected to be formed by at least four 
member states. As Baldwin and Widgren underline Germany and two of the six larger 
countries’ votes were sufficient to obstruct the act, yet the proposed condition 
necessitates one additional ally in a coalition of blocking minority.153 Furthermore, the 
final text of the Constitution was issued on 12-13 December 2003 in the meeting of 
European Council, yet at the last minute Spanish and Polish rejections failed this draft. 
Member states were willing to continue their search and in March 2004 Irish proposal 
of increasing both thresholds to 55% and 65% was considered. The IGC summit of 
June 2004 succeeded to get the approval of renewed Constitutional Treaty by all 
member states and presented to the national governments for ratification. What were 
the reasons of Spain and Poland to reject at the last minute of the IGC 2003? What 
changed for Spain and Poland to agree the latter Irish proposal?  
 
5.2. Possible Reasons of Vetoes 
 
According to media, underlying reason of these vetoes was the distribution of 
power.154 The higher power share would bring both states benefits to defend their 
preferences as in the distribution of EU funds. Ade emphasizes that Spain and Poland 
had ‘lots of at stake’ about the allocation of EU funds. Spain was the largest beneficiary 
before the May 2004 enlargement and was willing to preserve the status quo. However, 
Poland as an accessing state that would become the poorest member state, which would 
receive a large share from EU funds. In order to impede the legislation, which would be 
in favor of Poland, Spain would try to make process harder to legislate, yet Poland 
would behave in the contrary.155 If the status quo could be preserved Spain might have 
formed a strong blocking minority, whereas Poland would be a tough competitor. 
                                                 
153 Baldwin,R&Widgren,M.(2004).Council voting in the Constitutional Treaty, Devil in Details.p. 2 
154 Ade, F.(2005). Decision making in Europe. p.15. 
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Consequently, for both member states loosing the advantage of Nice Treaty would 
harm their positions on voting.  
 
On the other hand, under the convention rules formation of blocking minority is 
getting harder due to the population threshold of 60%. Therefore, following the 
rejections of Spain and Poland in IGC 2003, the negotiations were continued around 
this issue.156 Increase in the population threshold was also agreed by Germany and 
France, yet the maximum was 62% for them. However, Spain and Poland proposed the 
percentage of 66 that grants them capability to block the policies with the alliance of 
two larger states as in the Nice rules. In the meantime, Ireland prepared a proposal 
during its Presidency of Council. According to this schema, 55% of the member states’ 
votes (should consist of fifteen member states), which represents 65% of EU population 
comprise the double majority. The conclusion on the population percentages was in 
favor of Spain and Poland, it was not the percentage expected.  
 
Nevertheless both Ade and Tsebelis do not find these reasons sufficient to veto 
the Constitutional Treaty. By underlining the political situation in Spain and Poland, 
both argue that the national governments used veto card as the reflection of the 
weaknesses in domestic politics. According to Ade, Spanish President Aznar was 
coping with problems as “its support of a war in Iraq that was opposed by a majority of 
the population, struggling about welfare state reforms, discontent with the involvement 
of the government in Spanish media, problems in the educational sector and finally 
governments’ poor handling of an environmental catastrophe.” These are not vital 
problems, yet for the coming elections in March 2004 Aznar were willing to refresh its 
strong position, especially on the domestic platform.157 In addition to financial losses 
stemming from Germany, France and Italy’s actions, Aznar maintained his opposition 
to Constitutional Treaty.158 However, the election result was not as expected. Unlike 
Aznar, the new Spanish government under the leadership of Zapatero followed more 
flexible politics on EU relations, especially after 3/11 disaster159. After this terrorist 
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attack, Zapatero declared his positive approach to cooperation on EU-level and 
Constitutional Treaty by stating that “We have a treaty which isn't ideal, but it is a 
treaty which will allow us to develop further.”160 Consequently, Spain left its ally alone 
before the end of the IGC 2004. 
 
In the case of Poland, Prime Minister Miller’s position was vulnerable than 
Aznar’s in domestic politics, on account of ‘high unemployment, high budget deficit 
and political scandals’. In addition, Poland’s agricultural sector was pushed too far for 
reforms of EU, which led to the aversion on Polish citizens.161 Therefore, Ade claims 
that Miller tried to draw a strong image of Poland in the eyes of its citizens by vetoing 
policies on EU-level, if it requires additional concessions.162 However, at the end in 
May 2004 Prime Minister Miller resigned. Afterwards, President Kaczynski continued 
Poland’s opposition till the next IGC 2007 and as Baldwin asserts he was able to get 
what Poland wants.  
 
Consequently, Treaty of Lisbon includes double majority voting with 
concessions for Poland. The thresholds kept as the same; 55% of member states votes 
and 65% of EU population. Blocking minority should be consisting of at least four 
member states, which is in favor of both Spain and Poland by enabling them to form 
blocking minorities. Most significantly, double majority system will be operational in 
2014 in decision-making; however until 2017 member states are capable of requesting 
qualified majority voting on the articles that are subject to double majority. As Baldwin 
claims member states will prefer to use Nice rules in stead of double majority until 
2017, thanks to the extention.163 Finally, Poland was able to add Ioannina Compromise 
to a Protocol that enables national governments, which cannot form a blocking 
minority, to postpone the measure ‘for a reasonable time’.164  
 
Before determination of most of these concessions, Spain completed its 
ratification process for Treaty of Lisbon. However, Poland negotiated till the last 
minute and still does not finalized Treaty of Lisbon’s ratification. The parliamentary 
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and governmental processes were already completed, but President Kaczynski did not 
approve the ratification since April 2008.165 He is being compelled to sign from both 
domestic and international representatives.  
 
5. Concluding Remarks 
 
According to Zapatero, collaboration on EU-level, especially on the issues of 
security and police cooperation, would bring higher benefits to Spain in the expense of 
its relative power in decision-making. On the other hand, in Poland that had the same 
voting share with Spain, the concept of cooperation did not perceived as a sufficient 
consequence to compromise on its relative power. That brings back the concept of 
asymmetric policy interdependence. Spanish deeper interdependence on cooperation 
led to sacrifice its voting share as a compromise, whereas Poland used the 
interdependence of other member states in favor of itself and turn this advantage to a 
veto power. Consequently, Poland pays back Spanish favor of Aznar bonus by 
concessions in Treaty of Lisbon, if it is operationalized.    
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
165 Euractiv. Ratifying Treaty of Lisbon. 
 69 
COCLUSIO 
   
 Stone Sweet and Sandholtz argued an evolution of EU integration towards a 
supranational end; in contrast Moravcsik advocates continuing member states’ 
dominance in EU future. Both perspectives handle institutional reforms as the 
instruments for their explanation. For instance, extension of co-decision procedure 
leads to the decrease in member states’ autonomy and capabilities for Stone Sweet and 
Sandholtz, whereas Moravcsik consider this expansion as the consequence of the aim to 
achieve a higher benefit without compromising more. Due to this commonality, this 
thesis focused on these legislative instruments to clarify the current positions and roles 
of member states in decision-making process without despising supranational 
institutions’ roles. Commission and Parliament have specified roles; however, as the 
starting point of this thesis neither Commission nor Parliament is superior to the 
Council in EU legislation. Consequently, findings of this thesis are supported by Schulz 
and König’s research on efficiency in decision-making brought by institutional reforms: 
  
 “(1) participation of the Parliament increases the duration of the decisionmaking  
                   Process;  
   (2) the use of qualified majority rule decreases the proposal-decision time 
        lag...” 
 
 Among all legislative procedures with the recent proposal to extend co-decision 
procedure, it is determined as a crucial indication of a movement towards a 
supranational European system together with the decline in member states’ control. 
However, if co-decision procedure’s restricted scope is left aside, competences that are 
granted Parliament do not assure diminishment of Council’s role in legislation. Firstly, 
Council and Parliament’s approaches to proposals do not always have to be 
contradicting each other. Secondly, Parliament’s tendency to prove itself as a stronger 
institution leads to the consideration of citizens perspectives, who are most of the time 
supporting Parliament against other institutions. Parliament’s decision to reject the 
proposal after the second reading may pave the way to decline in its credibility, on 
account of ignoring conciliation committee’s existence. As a result, continuation of the 
co-decision procedure with conciliation committee, if there is disagreement between 
two institutions would not be the at the expense of the Council. It still has its control 
over conclusions, even in the co-decision procedure. Thus co-decision procedure 
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increases Parliament’s voice, yet does not devalue Council’s role in legislation. 
Therefore, broadening co-decision procedure’s scope cannot be defined as an outcome 
of a perception that will gradually restrict member states’ autonomy and capabilities; 
rather it represents member states’ authority over legislation procedure as ‘pathfinders’.  
  
 Furthermore, Schulz and König define qualified majority rule as the an efficient 
instrument to use in decision-making. Extension of qualified majority voting’s 
influence area is argued to be the consequence of the specified supranational tendency. 
However, if the past of the voting procedures are considered, each voting results 
constitute both losers and winners, due to the asymmetric policy interdependence. Yet, 
none of the cases distributed equal benefits/losses to all member states. Therefore, a 
mechanism to organize these differences would be useful to minimize the total loss and 
maximize the benefits. After some time, qualified majority voting determined as that 
mechanism. As a result of adjusting certain thresholds and rules, international 
bargaining turned into a crucial part of this mechanism. Therefore, fundamentally there 
has been no change in the voting process in accordance to the differentiation of losers 
and winners. There are still winners and losers. Thus extension of the scope of qualified 
majority voting becomes insignificant; on the other hand bargaining and in relation 
member states’ relative power come into prominence. In addition, even though if it is 
admitted that the extension of qualified majority does not make any change between the 
past and the present, member states’ still scrutinize the issues proposed to be moved 
into qualified majority. Therefore, the vital subjects are kept under unanimity, whereas 
clauses about Community issues are continued to be extended. Hence, there is no 
alteration in member states’ roles; they are still determining actors.        
  
 Moreover, increasing role of the bargaining between member states caused 
tough negotiations on distributions of variables of relative power as voting weights. If a 
member state could obtain higher voting weights, its capabilities to form both coalition 
and blocking minority increases at the same percentages. Therefore, experienced vetoes 
and clashes during the latest IGCs were mostly the consequences of this bargaining. 
Approval of proposed calculations at the first place by all members was not an 
obtainable result, thus negotiations were intensified and trump cards were put on the 
table. The ones, which show the right card at the right time, become the winners of that 
bargaining as Poland. However, member states’ are not bargaining in a bell jar, they are 
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affecting from external factors too as in the case of Spain’s 3/11. That is able to change 
the perception of the member state and lead to renew its cost and benefit analysis. 
Therefore, Spain changed its side and left Poland alone in its fight. Poland was lucky in 
the IGC 2003-2004 and IGC 2007. Spain provided Poland higher voting weights with 
Treaty of Nice and now it is Poland’s turn. Continuing negotiations and Poland’s veto 
power in its hand pave the way to ‘Poland’s victory’166.   
  
 Consequently, Stone Sweet and Sandholtz and Hosli’s approaches to legislative 
instruments do not present the current circumstances, rather these stand closer to 
Moravcsik’s perspective of member states’, which determine actors, instruments that 
will be used by these actors, their competences and relations between to create an 
efficient decision-making process in order to achieve higher benefits as individual 
member states.  
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APPEDIX 
 
Table 2. Treaty of Rome: Extension of Qualified Majority Voting167  
 
Title as in the Treaty Content of the Article umber of the Article 
Principles rules to prevent discrimination on the grounds of nationality Article 7 
Free Movement of Goods 
autonomous alteration or suspension of common customs tariff duties etc. 
not exceeding 20 per cent of the rate. 
Article 28 (after trns. 
per.) 
application of competition rules to agriculture Article  42 (after 2nd) 
implementing the common agricultural policy Article  43(2) (after 2nd) 
 
Agriculture 
 establishment of common agricultural market organizations Article  43(3) (after 2nd) 
freedom of establishment Article  54(2) (after 1st) 
exclusion of certain activities from freedom of establishment Article  55  
co-ordination of certain national provisions concerning special treatment of 
foreign nationals 
Article  56(2) (after 2nd) 
mutual recognition of diplomas Article  57(1) (after 1st) 
taking up and pursuit of activities by certain self-employed persons Article  57(2) (after 1st)
  
liberalization of services Article  63(2) (after 1st) 
free movement of capital Article  69 (after 2nd)  
amendment of national measures restricting free movement of capital Article  70(2) 
 
 
 
 
Free Movement of Persons, Services 
and Capital 
 
revocation of Commission authorization of a member state’s protective 
measures in field of capital movements 
Article 73(1) 
 inland transport policy Article  75(1) (after 2nd)
                                                 
167 Miller, V.(2004). The Extension of Qualified Majority Voting from the Treaty of Rome to the European Constitution. House of Commons Library, Research Paper 
04/54.p.10. 
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  Transport 
elimination of discrimination between carriers Article  79(3)   
competition rules Article  87(1)               
(after 3 years)  
additional categories of state aids considered compatible with the common 
market 
Article  92(3)(d) 
state aid rules Article  94 
special authorization of export refunds or countervailing charges on imports Article  98 
 
 
Common Rules on Competition, 
Taxation and Approximation of Laws 
 
directives to remove distortions or competition caused by differences 
between national laws 
Article  101 (after 1st) 
directives to implement conjectural policy measures adopted under article 
103(2) 
Article 103 
grant of mutual assistance to meet balance of payments difficulties Article 108(2)   
revocation or amendment of Commission authorization of a member state’s 
protective measures to meet balance of payments difficulties 
Article 108(3)   
 
 
Economic and Monetary Policy 
amendment of a member state’s protective measures to meet a sudden 
balance of payments crisis 
Article 109 
harmonization of export aids Article 112(1) (after 2nd) 
common commercial policy Article 113   
conclusion of certain commercial agreements with third countries Article 114 (after 2nd) 
 
Common Commercial Policy 
 
common action in international organizations of an economic character Article 116 
(aftertrns.per.) 
stopping certain social fund assistance Article 126(a) (after t.p.) Social Policy, Education,          
Vocational Training and Youth 
European Social Fund  Article 127   
salaries of EC staff (now found in article 6 of merger treaty) Article 154 
establishment of a draft budget Article 203(3) 
 
Provisions Governing the Institutions 
decisions on budget amendments and modifications proposed by European 
Parliament 
Article 203(5) 
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altering maximum rate of increase in budget (with agreement of EP) Article 203  
authorizing expenditure in excess of provisional twelfths at beginning of 
financial year 
Article 204 
remuneration of members of the Court of Auditors Article 206  
recommendation to Parliament that Commission be given discharge in 
respect of implementation of the budget 
Article 206(b) 
   
 
 
Table 3. Single European Act: Extension of Qualified Majority Voting168  
*New articles subject to qualified majority voting 
 
Title as in the SEA Treaty Content of the Article umber of the Article 
Internal Market 
guidelines and conditions necessary to ensure balanced progress in all the 
sectors concerned169 
Article 8b* 
Free Movement of Goods autonomous alteration or suspension of duties in the common customs tariff Article 28 
taking up and pursuit of activities by certain self-employed persons170 Article 57(2) 
extension of free movement of services to national of a third country Article 59(2) 
Free Movement of Persons, Services 
and Capital 
 
capital movements between member states and third countries Article 70(1) 
                                                 
168 Miller, V.(2004). The Extension of Qualified Majority Voting from the Treaty of Rome to the European Constitution. House of Commons Library, Research Paper      
      04/54.p.11. 
169 Supplemented by Article 14 of SEA 
170 amended by the SEA 
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Transport sea and air transport171  Article 84(2)    
approximation of provisions affecting functioning of common market 172 Article 100a 
Common Rules on Competition, 
Taxation and Approximation of Laws mutual recognition of national measures affecting the functioning of the 
internal market173 
Article 100b 
Social Policy adoption of minimum requirements for health and safety of workers174 Article 118a*   
Economic and Social Cohesion implementing decisions relating to European regional development fund Article 130e* 
Research and Technological 
Development 
adoption of certain provisions implementing the framework program on 
research and technological development 
Article 130q(2)* 
Environment 
 
decisions on matters relating to the environment in respect of which the 
Council decides by unanimity that decisions are to be taken by QMV  
Article 130s*   
 
 
 
Table 4. Treaty of Maastricht (TEU): Extension of Qualified Majority Voting  
 
Title as in the TEU Content of the Article umber of the Article 
Provisions on a Common Foreign and 
Security Policy 
decisions implementing common foreign and security policy joint actions175 Article J.3(2) 
decisions implementing Justice and Home Affairs (JHA) joint actions176 Article K.3(2)b Provisions on Cooperation in the field 
of Justice and Home Affairs application of Article 100c of EC Treaty to some aspects of JHA177  Article K.9 
                                                 
171 amended by the SEA 
172 supplemented by Article 18 of SEA 
173 supplemented by Article 19 of SEA 
174 Supplemented by Article 21 of SEA 
175 Only if it is unanimously agreed in Council to vote by qualified majority 
176 Only if it is unanimously agreed in Council to vote by qualified majority 
177 Only if it is unanimously agreed in Council to vote by qualified majority 
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movement of capital to or from third countries Article 73c(2)  
condition to take safeguard measures Article 73f 
movement of capital and payments to implement sanctions Article 73g(1)   
Free Movement of Persons, Services 
and Capital 
abolishing above sanctions Article 73g(2) 
Transport transport safety Article 75   
Common Rules on Competition, 
Taxation and Approximation of Laws 
establishing a list of third country nationals who require visas Article 100c(2-3) 
broad economic guidelines Article 103(2)   
make public recommendations on compliance with economic guidelines Article 103(4)   
rules for multi-lateral surveillance 
Article 103(5)  
  
bail-out fund in the event of a natural disaster Article 103a(2) 
definitions for applying prohibition on assuming financial liability Article 104a(2) 
definition of prohibitions regarding credit institutions Article 104b(2) 
excessive deficits procedure Article 104c(6-14) 
harmonizing coins Article 105a(2) 
ECSB statutes Article 106(5-6) 
exchange rate agreements Article 109(1-4) 
decision on the position of the Community at international level as regards 
issues of particular relevance to EMU 
Article 109(3) 
Economic and Financial Committee Article 109c(3) 
consultation of Economic and Monetary Institute (EMI) Article 109f(6) 
mutual assistance in the event of balance of payments difficulties Article 109h(2) 
protective measures (EMU) Article 109h(3) 
suspending protective measures (EMU) Article 109i(3) 
moving to stage III of EMU Article 109j(2-3) 
Economic and Monetary Policy 
 
Economic and Monetary Policy 
 
stage III EMU derogations Article 109k(1)   
Education, Vocational Training and Education Article 126 
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Youth vocational training (was simple majority under Article 128) Article 127   
Public Health public health Article 129 
Consumer Protection consumer protection Article 129a   
Trans-European Networks guidelines of Trans-European Networks Article 129d   
Research and Technological 
Development 
development co-operation Article 130i(4) 
Environment certain environmental measures Article 130s   
Development Article 130w   
Development Cooperation 
regulations and conditions for performance of Ombudsman’s tasks Article 138e   
allowances of members of Economic and Social Committee Article 194   
conclusion of international agreements on subjects where internal decision-
making is by QMV, codifies existing practice 
Article 228(1-2) Institutions of the Community 
measures to implement sanctions       Article 228a   
     
 
 
 
Table 5. Treaty of Amsterdam: Extension of Qualified Majority Voting  
 
Title as in the Treaty of Amsterdam Content of the Article umber of the Article 
Common Provisions 
suspension of Member State rights (including voting rights) if breach of 
fundamental principles is established by unanimity, and subsequently 
variation or revocation of such measures 
Article 7 TEU 
Provisions on a Common Foreign and 
Security Policy 
adoption of common foreign and security policy (CFSP) joint actions, 
common positions or any other decision based on a common strategy 
(subject to an emergency brake, and no QMV for decisions have military or 
defense implications) and any decision implementing a CFSP joint action or 
common position (subject to an emergency brake, and no QMV for 
decisions have military or defense implications) 
Article 23(2) TEU 
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Provisions on Cooperation in the field 
of Justice and Home Affairs 
measures to implement certain Justice and Home Affairs (JHA) decisions 
11TEU authorization of closer co-operation to develop the area of freedom, 
security and justice (subject to an emergency brake) 
Article 34(2)(c) TEU 
Agriculture compensatory aid for imports of raw materials Article 37(4) TEC  
authorization of closer co-operation in the TEC (subject to emergency 
brake) 
Article 40 
co-ordination of provisions laid down by law, regulation or administrative 
action for special treatment for foreign nationals (right of establishment) 
Article 46(2) Free Movement of Persons, Services 
and Capital 
 establishing list of third countries whose nationals who are exempt from 
visas (only European Parliament (EP) consultation) and a uniform format for 
visas; procedures and conditions for issuing visas and rules on a uniform 
visa (five years from entry into force of Amsterdam Treaty) 
Article 62 
employment guidelines (only EP consultation) Article 128*   
Economic and Monetary Policy 
employment incentive measures Article 129*   
Common Commercial Policy Customs co-operation Article 135* 
social exclusion Article 137(2)* 
approval of agreements concluded by management and labor Article 139(2)   
Social Policy, Education, Vocational 
Training and Youth 
equality of opportunity and treatment of men and women Article 141(3)* 
Public Health public health Article 152(4)*   
adoption of the Research Framework Program Article 166(1)   
adopting or supplementing the Research Framework Program Article 166(2)  
Research and Technological 
Development 
setting up of joint undertakings in Research and Technological development Article 172 
Provisions Common to Several 
Institutions 
transparency (access to documents) Article 255* 
Financial Provisions combating fraud against the Community's financial interests Article 280* 
Statistics Article 285* 
establishment of an independent advisory body on data protection Article 286* General and Final Provisions 
outermost regions Article 299(2)* 
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Table 6. Treaty of ice: Extension of Qualified Majority Voting  
 
Title as in the Treaty of ice Content of the Article umber of the Article 
 
determination that there is a clear risk of a serious breach by a member 
state of fundamental principles (four-fifths majority required) 
Article 7.1  
Citizenship of the Union 
provisions facilitating the exercise of the right of citizens of the Union to 
move and reside within the territory of the member states—with caveats 
Article 18 TEC 
appointment of common foreign and security policy (CFSP) special 
representatives with emergency brake 
Article 23(2) TEU 
conclusion of international agreements in order to implement a CFSP joint 
action of common position, or on matters covered by TEU Titles V and VI 
for which QMV is required for the adoption of internal decisions or 
measures 
Article 24 TEU 
procedure for authorizing enhanced co-operation under TEU Title V, with 
emergency brake; 
Article 27(c) - 44 TEU* 
 
Provisions on a Common the Foreign 
and Security Policy 
 
decision to hold in abeyance a member state's request to participate in a 
CFSP enhanced co-operation activity 
Article 27(e) TEU*  
Provisions on Cooperation in the field 
of Justice and Home Affairs 
procedure for establishing enhanced co-operation under TEU Title VI, 
following referral to the European Council 
Article 40(a) TEU* 
criteria and mechanisms for determining the member state responsible for 
considering asylum applications, provided that the Council has already 
unanimously defined common rules and basic principles 
Article 63(1)(a) TEC 
minimum standards on reception of asylum seekers, provided that the 
Council has already unanimously defined common rules and basic principles 
Article 63(1)(b) TEC 
minimum standards with respect to the qualification of third country 
nationals as refugees, provided that the Council has already unanimously 
defined common rules and basic principles 
Article 63(1)(c) TEC 
Free Movement of Persons,            
Services and Capital 
 
minimum standards on the procedures in member states for granting or 
withdrawing refugee status, provided that the Council has already 
Article 63(1)(d) TEC 
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unanimously defined common rules and basic principles 
minimum standards for giving temporary protection to displaced 
persons/refugees, provided that the Council has already unanimously 
defined common rules and basic principles 
Article 63(2)(a) TEC 
measures improving and simplifying co-operation in civil law matters 
(except family law cases), inc. cross-border service of judicial documents, 
evidence taking, recognition/enforcement of decisions 
Article 65(a) TEC 
measures promoting the compatibility of the rules applicable in member 
states concerns the conflict of laws and of jurisdictions (except family law 
cases) 
Article 65(b) TEC 
measures eliminating obstacles to the good functioning of civil proceedings 
(except family law cases) 
Article 65(c) TEC 
measures to ensure co-operation between the relevant departments of the 
administrations of the member states, and between those departments and 
the Commission, in the areas covered by Title IV (from 1 May 2004)  
Article 66 TEC 
measures in the event of severe difficulties in the supply of certain products Article 100(1) TEC   
community financial assistance, under certain conditions, to a member state 
which is in difficulties or is seriously threatened with severe difficulties 
caused by natural disasters or exceptional circumstances beyond its control 
Article 100(2) TEC 
Economic and Monetary Policy 
measures necessary for the rapid introduction of the euro in member states 
without a derogation 
Article 123(4) TEC 
Common Commercial Policy 
negotiation and conclusion of international agreements on trade in services 
and trade-related aspects of intellectual property (with caveats) 
Article 133(5) TEC   
Social Policy, Education, Vocational 
Training and Youth 
potentially, measures in some areas of social protection, following 
agreement by unanimity to move to QMV 
Article 137(2) TEC 
Industry 
 
measures supporting the action of member states on industry matters 
Development Cooperation 
Article 157(3) TEC 
specific actions for economic and social cohesion outside the structural 
funds 
Article 159 TEC Economic and Social Cohesion 
From 1 January 2007 asks, priority objectives, organization and rules Article 161(1) TEC 
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applicable to the structural funds 
creation of a cohesion fund (delayed deadline) Article 161(2) TEC 
economic, financial and technical co-operation with third countries Article 181a TEC* 
approval of the MEPs' statute (except rules or conditions relating to the 
taxation of MEPs) 
Article 190(5) TEC 
laying down regulations governing political parties at European level, inc. 
funding 
Article 191(2) TEC 
appointment of the Secretary-General and Deputy Secretary-General of the 
Council 
Article 207(2) TEC 
extension of the scope of Article 210 to cover the salaries, allowances and 
pensions of the members and Registrar of the Court of First Instance (CFI) 
Article 210 TEC 
nomination and appointment of the President and members of the 
Commission 
Article 214 TEC 
filling a vacancy in the Commission caused by death, compulsory retirement 
or resignation 
Article 215 TEC 
approval of the European Court of Justice's rules of procedure Article 223(6) TEC 
approval of the CFI's rules of procedure Article 224(5) TEC 
approval of the Judicial Panels' rules of procedure Article 225a(5) TEC* 
appointment of the members of the Court of Auditors Article 247(3) TEC 
approval of the Court of Auditors' rules of procedure Article 248(4) TEC 
appointment of the Economic and Social Committee members Article 259(1) TEC 
Provisions Governing the Institutions 
 
appointment of the Committee of the Regions members Article 263 TEC 
Financial Provisions 
financial Regulations/rules concerning the responsibility of financial 
controllers, authorizing officers and accounting officers as of 2007 
Article 279(1)a-b TEC 
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Table 7. Constitutional Treaty: Extension of Qualified Majority Voting  
 
Title as in the Constitutional Treaty Content of the Article umber of the Article 
European Council to establish list of Council configurations other than 
Foreign Affairs Council 
Article I-24(4)* 
European Council to set conditions for rotation of Council Presidency Article I-24(7) 
The Union’s Institutions and Bodies 
European Council to appoint Foreign Affairs Minister Article I-28* 
arrangements for control of implementing powers Article I-37 
Exercise of Union’s Competence approximation of national laws in Part III to achieve area of freedom, 
security and justice 
Article I-42 
determining procedures for citizens’ initiative, including minimum number 
of Member States required 
Article I-47(4)* 
The Democratic Life of the Union 
general principles and limits governing the right of access to Union 
documents and institutions’ rules of procedure on access to documents 
Article I-50(3-4) 
expenditure under Article III-412  Article I-53(3-4)   
The Union's Finances 
establishing budget under III-404 Article I-56 
Union Membership 
conclusion of agreement with Member State wishing to withdraw from 
Union and with the Union, with EP consent 
Article I-60* 
Provisions of General Application 
defining principles and conditions, especially economic and financial, on 
which services of general interest should operate 
Article III-122 
freedom of movement for migrant workers – social security provisions (2) 
contains referral clause: if Member State thinks its own social security 
system would be affected, QMV procedure suspended and matter referred to 
European Council, which may refer draft back to Council or ask 
Commission to submit new proposal  
Article III-136(1) 
Free Movement of Person and 
Services 
provisions on uniform intellectual property rights protection, for 
authorization, coordination and supervision of arrangements, except 
unanimity for sub-paragraph 2 on language arrangements for the above 
Article III-176* 
Research and Technological measures for drawing up a European Space Policy  Article III-254* 
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Development and Space 
Energy energy measures, except if primarily of a fiscal nature Article III-256* 
measures on: uniform status of asylum for third country nationals uniform 
status of subsidiary protection for third country nationals, common system 
of temporary protection for displaced persons in the event of a massive 
inflow; common procedures for granting/withdrawing uniform 
asylum/subsidiary protection; standards for conditions for reception of 
asylum applicants; cooperation with third countries to manage inflows  
Article III-266 
measures on: conditions of entry/residence, standards for long-term 
visas/permits, including for family reunion; definition of rights of third 
country nationals living legally in Union; illegal immigration and residence 
in Union, including removal and repatriation; combating person trafficking, 
especially women and children 
Article III-267(2) 
Policies on Border Checks, Asylum 
and Immigration 
incentive and support measures to promote integration of legal third country 
nationals, excluding harmonization 
Article III-267(4) 
Judicial Cooperation in Civil Matters 
judicial cooperation in civil matters, especially for the proper functioning of 
the internal market 
Article III-269 
judicial cooperation in criminal matters, except other aspects of criminal 
procedure identified by a European decision 
Article III-270 
minimum rules on definition of criminal offences and sanctions in the areas 
of particularly serious crime with cross-border dimensions and (2), 
minimum rules regarding definition of criminal offences and sanctions in the 
area concerned, but with referral mechanism to European Council and 
possible withdrawal 
Article III-271* 
Judicial Cooperation in Criminal 
Matters 
measures to support Member States in crime prevention Article III-272* 
incentive actions to encourage cooperation between Member States in 
cultural matters, conservation of cultural heritage, exchanges, artistic and 
literary creation, excluding harmonization  
Article III-280 
Culture 
measures in tourism to complement Member State action without 
harmonization of laws or regulations 
Article III-281* 
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Civil Protection 
measures to encourage cooperation in civil protection, to protect against 
man-made and natural disasters, excluding harmonization 
Article III-284* 
Administrative Cooperation measures to help Member States to implement Union law Article III-285* 
Council decision on permanent structured cooperation and list of 
participating Member States after consulting Foreign Affairs Minister 
Article III-312(2)* 
Council will confirm participation of Member State fulfilling the criteria for 
permanent structured cooperation 
Article III-312(3)* 
The Common Security and Defense 
Policy 
Council may suspend a Member State from a structured cooperation Article III-312(4)* 
Development Cooperation 
measures defining framework in which Union’s humanitarian operations are 
implemented 
Article III-316* 
The Court of Justice of the European 
Union 
establish specialized Court attached to High Court; rules on organization and 
jurisdiction of Court 
Article III-359 
The European Investment Bank amending Articles 4, 11, 12, 18(5) of European Investment Bank Statute Article III-393 
Special Provisions 
establish provisions for an open, efficient, independent European 
administration to support institutions, bodies, offices and agencies of the 
Union 
Article III-398* 
    
 
 
 
Table 8. Treaty of Lisbon: Extension of Qualified Majority Voting178 
 
Title as in the Treaty of Lisbon Content of the Article umber of the Article 
election of the President of the European Council by the European Council Article 15 TEU 
adoption of the list of configurations of the Council of Ministers by the 
European Council 
Article 16 TEU 
Provisions on the Institutions 
 
appointment of the High Representative by the European Council, with the Article 18 TEU 
                                                 
178 Robert Schuman Foundation.(2007). The Lisbon Treaty. Retrieved from http://www.robert-schuman.org/doc/divers/lisbonne/en/10fiches.pdf 
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approval of the President of the Commission 
decision defining the European Defense Agency’s statute, seat and 
operational rules 
Article 45 TEU 
Specific Provisions on the Common 
Foreign and Security Policy decisions establishing permanent structured cooperation, suspending or 
accepting new members on the basis of the notification of voluntary 
Members and after consultation of the High Representative 
Article 46 TEU 
Final Provisions 
conclusion of a withdrawal agreement of a Union Member State after the 
approval of the European Parliament and on the request of the State 
concerned 
Article 50 TEU 
Non-Discrimination and Citizenship 
of the Union 
regulations relating to procedures and conditions required for a citizens' 
initiative 
Article 24 TEU 
Evaluation measures of the implementation of the area of freedom, security 
and justice after simply informing the European Parliament and national 
parliaments 
Article 70 TEU 
General Provisions 
Administrative cooperation within the area of freedom, security and justice 
after consulting the European Parliament 
Article 74 TEU 
Measures concerning border checks Article 77 TEU 
Measures concerning a common European asylum system  
Provisional emergency measures in case of a sudden inflow of refugees after 
consulting the European Parliament 
Article 78 TEU 
Policies on Border Checks, Asylum 
and Immigration 
 Measures concerning a common immigration policy 
Measures to provide incentives and support for the action of Member States 
with a view to promoting the integration of third-country nationals residing 
legally on their territories, excluding any harmonization measure 
Article 79 TEU 
Judicial Cooperation in Civil Matters 
Measures concerning the judicial cooperation in civil matters having a cross-
border dimension 
Article 81 TEU 
Measures to promote and support the action of Member States in the field of 
crime prevention excluding any harmonization measure 
Article 84 TEU 
Judicial Cooperation in Criminal 
Matters Regulations concerning Eurojust’s structure, operation, field of action and 
tasks 
Article 85 TEU  
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Police Cooperation 
Regulations concerning Europol’s structure, operation, field of action and 
tasks 
Article 88 TEU 
Transports 
Establishment of rules concerning transport after consulting the Social and 
Economic Committee and the Committee of the Regions 
Article 91 TEU 
Approximation of Laws 
Measures concerning the creation of European intellectual property rights to 
provide uniform intellectual property rights protection throughout the Union 
and for the setting up of centralized Union-wide authorization, coordination 
and supervision arrangements 
Article 118 TEU 
Amendment of some articles of the Statute of the ESCB on a 
recommendation from the European Central Bank and after consulting the 
Commission or on a proposal from the Commission and after consulting the 
European Central Bank 
Article 129 TEU 
Monetary Policy 
Measures necessary for use of the euro after consulting the European Central 
Bank 
Article 133 TEU 
Education, Vocational Training, 
Youth and Sport 
Incentive measures in the fields of sport after consulting the Economic and 
Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions 
Article 165 TEU 
Culture 
Incentive measures in the cultural field excluding any harmonisation 
measure and after consulting the Committee of the Regions 
Article 167 TEU 
Research and Technological 
Development and Space 
Measures necessary to draw up a European Space Policy that may take the 
form of a European Space Program 
Article 189 TEU 
Energy 
Measures relating to energy after consulting the Economic and Social 
Committee and the Committee of the Regions 
Article 194 TEU 
Civil Protection 
Measures necessary for the achievement of objectives relating to 
cooperation between Member States in order to improve the effectiveness of 
systems for preventing and protecting against natural and manmade 
disasters, excluding any harmonization measure 
Article 196 TEU 
Common Commercial Policy 
Measures defining the framework for implementing the common 
commercial policy 
Negotiation and conclusion of agreements with one or more third countries 
or international organizations in the field of commercial policy 
Article 207 TEU 
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Economic, Financial and Technical 
Cooperation with Third Countries 
Urgent financial assistance measures Article 213 TEU 
Solidarity Clause 
Implementation of the solidarity clause in the event of a terrorist attack or a 
disaster (except if the decision has defense implications: unanimity) on a 
joint proposal of the High Representative and the Commission 
Article 222 TEU 
Decision taken by the European Council on the Presidency of Council 
configurations other than that of Foreign Affairs 
Article 236 TEU  
Regulations concerning the establishment of specialized courts attached to 
the General Court to hear and determine at first instance certain classes of 
action or proceedings brought in specific areas on a proposal from the 
Commission and after consultation of the Court of Justice or at the request 
of the Court of Justice and after consultation of the Commission 
Article 257 TEU 
Amendment of the provisions of the Court of Justice's Statute with the 
exception of Title I and article 64 at the request of the Court of Justice and 
after consultation of the Commission or on a proposal of the Commission 
and after consultation of the Court of Justice 
Article 281 TEU 
The Institutions 
Appointment of the president, vice-president and members of the ECB 
Governing Council by the European Council 
Article 283 TEU 
The Legal Acts of the Union, 
Adoption Procedures and other 
Provisions 
Rules and general principles concerning mechanisms for control by Member 
States of the Commission’s exercise of implementing powers 
Article 291 TEU 
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